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 Chapter 1: Introduction and context of the research 
1.1 Background  
Strikes are one of the bargaining tools used by workers to advance their interests,1 and 
historically, can be traced as far back as the industrial revolution of the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries.2 They were born out of the need to address the power imbalance between 
employees and employers.3 Customarily, employers have had financial muscle to advance 
their interests, whereas the strength of workers lies in their collectivism.4  
The purpose of a strike is to ensure that the employer’s business remains at a standstill until 
the demands of workers are met.5 Workers know that employers rely on them for production 
and that embarking on a strike means a decrease or stoppage in production, which has an 
adverse consequence on business.6 Thus, the relationship between employer and employee is 
one of interdependence: employees depend on their employers for a living, and employers 
depend on their employees for labour.7 
It is unfortunate that striking has come to be associated with violence.8 Striking and violence 
are not synonymous, despite the increasing number of violent strikes in South Africa that 
challenge this assertion. The scale of violence is increasing each year and the consequence of 
strikes on the national level has been devastating.9 
In a bid to curb the outbreak of violence that has consistently accompanied strikes, the 
legislature has devised ways to regulate strikes. These measures range from legislation to 
                                                          
1 A Levy ‘Can Anybody Hear Me? The Audi Rule and the Dismissal of Strikers’ (2010) 31 ILJ 825, 831. 
2 E Yavuz ‘The Industrial Revolution and Consequences’ 2 available at 
https://www.yeditepe.edu.tr/dotAsset/74101.pdf, accessed on 4 August 2014.  
3 J Brand ‘Strikes in Essential Services’ paper presented to the South African Society for Labour Law 
(SASLAW) (2010) 1 available at http://www.saslaw.org.za/papers/Strikes%20in%20Essential%20Services.doc, 
accessed on 29 June 2014. 
4 E Manamela & M Budeli ‘Employees’ Right to Strike and Violence in South Africa’ (2013) 46 CILSA 308, 
308. 
5 A Landman‘Protected Industrial Action and Immunity from the Consequences of Economic Duress’ (2001) 22 
ILJ 1509, 1509. 
6 Ibid. 
7 E Williams ‘The Employment Relationship’ (2010) 1 
http://guidesandtrackers.co.za/human_resource_management/module_2.pdf, accessed on 19 June 2014. 
8 C Mischke ‘Strike Violence and Dismissal: when Misconduct cannot be proven is Dismissal for Operational 
Requirements a Viable Alternative?’ (2012) 22 CLLJ 12, 12. 
9 Many strikes have left a trail of destruction and maimed productivity. Many workers have been dismissed, 
others killed and in the process, the economy has plummeted. 
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negotiated solutions.10 The passage of time has seen the effectiveness of each and every 
measure put to the test, and this study will evaluate those measures in the context of strike 
laws in South Africa. 
1.2 Problem statement 
There is nothing wrong with embarking on a strike. In fact, the right to strike is granted by 
both the Constitution and the LRA. However, what is of great concern is the relationship that 
exists between strikes and the collective violence that has increasingly accompanied strikes 
over the years. Some scholars and researchers such as Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, Karl von Holdt 
and Gavin Hartford have linked the violence with various factors including: (a) low wages 
that workers are paid, which creates a sense of relative deprivation: workers feel they are 
getting paid less than they ought to be paid;11 (b) the appalling working and living conditions 
that workers are subjected to. This is particularly the case with mine workers whose working 
conditions are rough and dangerous, with between nine and 15 hours of work a day, 12 
months a year. In addition, their backs get bruised and scared due to the rocks that fall on top 
of them when working underground, posing a daily threat to their lives.12 Miners live in 
informal settlements (hostels and shacks) provided for by mining companies, which 
sometimes run out of electricity, clean running water and lack proper sewage systems. This 
leads to the miners and their children having symptoms of chronic illnesses;13 (c) the 
increasingly close and sometimes inappropriate relationship between employers and trade 
union representatives, can cause a social distance between workers and their trade union 
representatives;14 (d) the political culture of violent behaviour during protests, which can be 
dated back to apartheid;15 and (e) the history of the ‘enemy status in the opposing camp’, 
where striking workers view management as the enemy and vice versa.16 The violence is 
                                                          
10 For example, the conclusion of collective agreements between employers and employees and the granting of 
prohibitory interdicts by the Labour Court. 
11 G Hartford ‘The Mining Industry Strike Wave: what are the Causes and what are the Solutions?’ (2012) 3 
available at 
http://uscdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/41878_2012_10_03_mining_strike_wave_analysis.
pdf, accessed on 10 October 2014. 
12 Ibid.  
13 T Ngcukaitobi ‘Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of Marikana’ (2013) 34 
ILJ 836, 839-840. 
14 O Jolys ‘Marikana and Beyond’ (2013) 9 available at http://www.rosalux.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Marikana-Labour-01_2013.pdf, accessed on 13 July 2014. 
15 K von Holdt ‘Institutionalisation, Strike Violence and Moral Orders’ (2010) 128 available at: 
http://transformation.ukzn.ac.za/index.php/transformation/article/download/1115/922, accessed on 9 May 2013. 
16 Ibid 135. 
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exacerbated by certain factors in strike action such as ‘scab labourers’ who become readily 
available as replacements for striking workers. This weakens the indispensability of strikers, 
and the replacement labourers also assume the status of enemies in the eyes of the replaced 
strikers.17  
These scholars have attributed strike violence to socio-economic and socio-political factors 
without having provided a coherent analysis of the law governing strikes, to determine what 
role played, if any, the law plays in strike violence. Thus, one of the purposes of undertaking 
a critical analysis of the law on strikes in South Africa (as the title of this dissertation 
suggests), is to determine whether these laws are responsible for the violence that ensues 
during strikes, or whether such violence is solely a result of other factors such as those 
discussed above. It is important to establish this in order to curb the violence that 
accompanies strikes.  
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The effect of strikes on the economy is a concern to every South African who is conscious of 
the need for a functional economy. At the same time the purpose behind the right to strike 
should not be ignored.18 The broad objective of this study is to explore the relationship 
between the strike action and the ensuring violence, and to establish the possible factors of 
violent strikes. More specifically, the study aims to examine the legal mechanisms which 
have been put in place by the legislature to regulate the violence associated with strikes and 
further to determine the sufficiency of these legal mechanisms. The study also considers 
whether there is need for an improvement in the legal mechanisms, and provides some 
possible solutions that could assist in curbing violent strikes. 
It is significant to have a study that critically evaluates the South African law on strikes. The 
study not only explores the importance of the right to strike, but also discusses the challenges 
which have come with that right. Of significance is the way in which strikes have a direct 
bearing on the economy. Thus, it is imperative that matters affecting the economy be 
discussed and solutions advanced with the aim of achieving industrial peace and economic 
stability in a way that balances the interests of all those involved.  
                                                          
17 von Holdt (Note 15 above) 147. 
18 The purpose of the right to strike is to create some sort of equilibrium in the collective bargaining system.  
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The specific objectives of the study can be broken down into five research questions, as 
follows: 
a. What is the law on strikes in South Africa? 
b. What are the different legal mechanisms that employers can use or the different legal steps 
they can take to try and prevent or minimise and/or regulate strike violence? 
c. How do employers deal with misconduct during strikes? 
d. Under what circumstances are trade unions liable for riot damage by their members during 
strikes?  
e. To what extent (if any) does the LRA contribute to strike violence, and are there any other 
possible drivers, or root causes of strike violence in South Africa? 
1.4 Conceptual framework  
This study is underpinned by the assumption that the employment relationship is inherently 
hostile. This is because strike violence is driven by the structural violence inherent in the 
employment relationship, particularly a labour intensive industry such as mining.19 Such 
structural violence takes the form of various labour related, socio-economic and socio-
political factors.20 Thus, the dissertation does not promise to find solutions to strike violence 
but possible ways of managing it. 
1.5 Research methodology 
The dissertation consists of desktop research, as opposed to empirical research. However, 
there are elements of empirical research, in chapter 3 and mostly chapter 6 of the dissertation. 
The empirical research was not conducted by the author of the dissertation, but by various 
persons who interviewed workers who participated in the 1992 and 2007 South African 
public service strikes. Interviews were also conducted (following the Marikana tragedy) with 
some Marikana mine workers and community members in the vicinity of the Marikana mine. 
In order to show the workers’ views in different industries of the private and public sectors, 
                                                          
19 J Martens & P Alexander ‘Marikana and Beyond’ (2013) 23 available at 
http://www.rosalux.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Marikana-Labour-01_2013.pdf, accessed on 13 July 
2014. 
20 Ngcukaitobi (note 13 above) 840. 
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and in order to paint a clear picture of some of their experiences, the author of the dissertation 
has included these interviews and provided an analysis of them. Reference is made to the 
Constitution,21 as the primary source of the right to strike. The dissertation refers extensively 
to the Labour Relations Act (LRA),22 as the statute which makes provision for the right to 
strike, and other provisions relating to strikes and strike violence. Other statutes relating to 
strikes and strike violence (such as the Regulation of Gatherings Act)23 are referred to. Lastly, 
the dissertation discusses, and sometimes examines case law surrounding strikes and strike 
violence and reviews scholarly literature.   
1.6 Structure of the dissertation  
Chapter 2 deals with the laws governing strikes. Great emphasis will be placed on sections 64 
and 65 of the LRA. Section 64 grants every employee the right to strike and sets out the 
procedures that must be followed in order for a strike to be protected. On the other hand, 
section 65 deals with the limitations on the right to strike. Chapter 3 deals with the different 
legal mechanisms an employer can use, or the different steps that an employer can take, to try 
to prevent, minimise and/or regulate strike violence. Chapter 4 deals with misconduct during 
strikes and dismissal for misconduct. This includes a discussion on derivative misconduct, 
which is a rule that workers can be disciplined or dismissed if they refuse to divulge who are 
or were the perpetrators of violence during a strike. Chapter 5 deals with the liability of trade 
unions where their members embark on an unprotected strike and further the liability of 
unions for members’ misconduct during a strike (whether protected or unprotected). Chapter 
6 deals with the socio-economic and socio-political factors driving strike violence. Lastly, 
Chapter 7 deals with recommendations made by the author to some of the problems identified 





                                                          
21 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
22 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.  
23 The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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Chapter 2: The laws governing strikes  
2.1 Introduction  
In South Africa, workers have a fundamental right to strike; hence the law governing strikes 
is comprehensive. A strike is often described as the most effective weapon24 against an 
employer, having the potential to narrow the gap existing in the (unequal) bargaining power 
relationship between employer and employee.25 As an effective weapon against employers, 
strikes also have the potential to cause, and in most cases actually do cause, substantial 
financial losses to the employer.26 Thus, if employees are going to embark on a strike, in 
order for the strike to be protected, the procedures provided for in the LRA must be followed. This 
chapter provides the statutory definition of a strike. It further provides explanations of the 
different forms of strikes, as provided in the statutory definition of a strike. The right to strike 
as granted by both the Constitution and the LRA is set out. Lastly, the chapter discusses the 
different limitations on the right to strike.  
2.2 The legal framework 
The legal framework consists of: the statutory definition of a strike; the different forms of 
strike; the two different kinds of strike; the right to strike, granted by both the Constitution 
and the LRA; and the limitations on the right to strike. Each aspect of the legal framework 
mentioned here will be dealt with in turn below. 
2.2.1 The statutory definition of a strike 
The LRA defines a strike as follows: 
The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by 
persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the 
purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
between employer and employee, and every reference to ‘work’ in this definition includes overtime 
work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory.27  
                                                          
24 JV du Plessis, MA Fouche & MW van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2 ed (1996) 305. 
25 Brand (note 3 above) 1. 
26 A good example is the recent five month long platinum mines strike (over better wages), which was estimated 
to have cost platinum mine producers approximately R25 billion in revenue. 
27 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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It is clear from the definition that the following elements must be present for the existence of 
a strike: (a) there must be collective action of workers with a common goal. It follows that an 
individual employee who decides not to work is not considered to be on strike; (b) there must 
be an act or omission. The most common act is the refusal or failure of the employees to 
work or to continue with their work, or a lack of progress in their work; (c) the reason behind 
the refusal to work must be to remedy a grievance or to resolve a dispute.  
In Leoni Wiring Systems (EL) (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
(NUMSA),28 after consultations on the closure of a plant, the union wrote to the employer 
expressing its dissatisfaction with the closure of the plant. The employer confirmed that some 
employees would be retrenched and presented a list of employees who would be retrenched. 
In response, the union gave the employer notice of its intention to strike over the closure of 
the plant. In response to the notice, the employer applied to the Labour Court to interdict the 
strike. The Court found that although the union had expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
closure of the plant, a dispute did not exist.29 The Court held that if a dispute arises between 
parties, it is not only the dispute itself that must be stated clearly, but also the outcome or 
solution to the dispute. The fact that a party is dissatisfied with another’s actions does not 
mean that the parties are, as a matter of fact, in dispute. The Court clarified that a dispute 
arises only when the parties express their differing views and assume different positions 
regarding a specific complicated fact.30  
In Afrox Ltd v South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU) and others,31 the employees 
embarked on a strike in order to pressurise the employer to abandon a staggered shift system. 
The employer abandoned the shift system and began retrenching some of the employees.32 
The Labour Court held that when the cause of complaint is removed, the existing strike is 
dysfunctional and no longer has a purpose. The Court held further that the employees could 
not continue striking in response to the retrenchments. This was because the retrenchments 
did not give rise to the dispute; instead it was the shift system that did so, which the employer 
later abandoned.33 
                                                          
28 Leoni Wiring Systems (EL) (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (2007) 28 ILJ 642 (LC). 
29 T Cohen, A Rycroft & B Whitcher Trade Unions and the Law in South Africa (2009) 47. 
30 Ibid 27. 
31 Afrox Ltd v SACWU and others [1997] 4 BLLR 382 (LC). 
32 Cohen (note 29 above) 48. 
33 Afrox Ltd (note 31 above) 388. 
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In Gobile v BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd and others,34 three employees refused to work 
overtime and on public holidays because they alleged, contrary to their employer’s view, that 
they were contractually not obliged to do so. Their refusal to work was not accompanied by 
any express demand. The Labour Appeal Court inquired into the purpose of their action in 
order to decide whether their refusal to work constituted a strike.35 The Court held that the 
employees’ aim was to make their employer accede to their perception of what their 
contractual obligations should be. Therefore, their actions constituted a strike.36  
The fourth element of a strike is that the dispute must be in respect of any “matter of mutual 
interest”37 between the employer and the employees. In Mzeku and others v Volkswagen SA 
(Pty) Ltd and others,38 the union suspended its shop stewards who had disregarded an 
agreement between the union and the employer. The employees stopped working and 
demanded that the shop stewards be reinstated.39 The Labour Appeal Court accepted the 
Labour Court’s reasoning that the work stoppage was not a strike. This was because it was 
aimed at resolving an internal dispute between the employees and the union and at forcing the 
union to accede to a demand. However, the Labour Appeal Court regarded the work stoppage 
as an unprotected strike and held that the employer could not comply with the demand.40 
2.2.2 The different forms of strike 
The following inferences can be drawn from a reading of the statutory definition of a strike: a 
strike can either be primary or secondary, and there are different employers for employees 
who engage in a primary strike as opposed to those who engage in a secondary strike. A 
primary strike is where the employees strike to place pressure on their own employer for their 
                                                          
34 Gobile v BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd and others (1999) 20 ILJ 2027 (LAC). 
35 Cohen (note 29 above) 48. 
36 Gobile (note 34 above)  9. See also Cohen (note 29 above) 48. 
37 A matter of mutual interest is a matter over which none of the parties to the dispute (that is, neither employer 
nor employee) have a right. This means a party cannot take another to court over such matter and if it did, the 
court would not make ruling on the matter, but dismiss it instead. This is because there is no case law or 
precedent on which a court can rely in order to reach a decision regarding a matter of mutual interest. This is 
further attributable to the fact that courts do not entertain matters of mutual interest because in order to litigate a 
person must have either an existing right to the issue in dispute or an interest in the matter. A ‘matter of mutual 
interest’ does not fall into either one of these two categories, which is why it is not entertained by the courts. 
Thus, such matters must be negotiated by the parties with the aim of reaching an agreement, failing which the 
matter will be taken, by either party to the dispute, to the relevant bargaining council, where the arbitrator or 
mediator will make a decision. 
38 Mzeku and others v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd and others (2001) 22 ILJ 1575 (LAC). 
39 Cohen (note 29 above) 49. 
40 Ibid. 
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own demands. These employees have a direct interest in the matter over which they strike.41 
In a secondary/sympathy strike, the employees who do not have a direct interest in the matter, 
strike in order to place pressure on the employer of the primary strikers.42 Secondary strikers 
can thus be seen as employees who merely offer their support or sympathy to the primary 
strikers, in order to intensify the strike and get the employer of the primary strikers to accede 
to their demands.43 
The three most important types of primary strikes are: a full work stoppage, a 
repetition/intermittent strike and a partial strike. These will all be discussed in turn. A full 
work stoppage44 is a complete refusal to work. A repetition/intermittent strike45 is a recurring 
strike, which is undertaken by the same employees in respect of the same issue(s) and at the 
same time.46 This type of strike could either be legal or illegal, depending on the 
circumstances under which it occurs. A partial strike47 is a strike which is short of a total 
stoppage of work. A partial strike is a collective term48 for a go-slow strike, a work to rule 
strike, an overtime ban and a sit-in. These will also be discussed in turn. In the case of a go-
slow49 strike, employees work at a slower pace than usual and the production rate is 
consequently slower than usual. The effect of such is that the employer experiences a 
decrease in income. Another consequence is that the workers who embark on this type of 
strike do not forfeit their wages. Further, it is not easy for the management of a company to 
take action against employees who embark on such a strike as it is difficult for an employer 
to prove that the employees are on a go-slow strike.50  
With a work-to-rule51 strike, the employees’ aim achieve is the same as in a go-slow, namely 
a decrease in income, but the method for achieving this is different. The employees try to 
ensure that the employer loses money, but without breaching the employment contract. With 
regards to an overtime ban,52 if employees are contractually obliged to work overtime and 
                                                          
41 Cohen (note 29 above) 65. 
42 C Cooper ‘Sympathy Strikes’ (1995) 16 ILJ 759, 759. 
43 C Kahnovitz ‘Secondary Strikes: when are they Permissible?’ (2006) 27 ILJ 2026, 2027. 
44 J Grogan Workplace Law 7 ed (2003) 327.   
45 Cohen (note 29 above) 46. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Grogan (note 44 above) 327. 
48 SR van Jaarsveld & BPS van Eck Principles of Labour Law (1998) 319. 
49 MA Chicktay ‘Defining the Right to Strike: a Comparative Analysis of International Labour Organisation 
Standards and South African Law’ (2012) Obiter 260, 268. 
50 van Jaarsveld (note 48 above) 320. 
51 Cohen (note 29 above) 46. 
52 Ibid. 
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they refuse to do so, such a refusal constitutes a strike. On the contrary, if no such contractual 
obligation exists, the employees’ refusal to work overtime will not constitute a strike. Lastly, 
a sit-in53 is when employees occupy their workplace with the aim of obstructing access to the 
work processes. However, this form of industrial action will only be regarded as a strike if the 
statutory requirements of a strike are complied with. 
2.2.3 The two different kinds of strike 
There are two different kinds of strike action in the LRA: protected and unprotected strikes. 
Protected strikes are contained in section 67 of the LRA. These are strikes that comply with 
the procedural requirements in section 64 of the LRA (including strike procedures contained 
in a collective agreement or the constitution of a bargaining council).54 The most important 
consequence of a protected strike is that employees who embark on such a strike may not be 
dismissed by their employer.55 Unprotected strikes are contained in section 68 of the LRA. 
These are strikes that do not comply with the procedural requirements in section 64 of the 
LRA. A strike is also unprotected if it is prohibited by section 65 (1) of the LRA. These are 
strikes over certain issues in dispute and strikes by persons who are employed in essential 
services, or maintenance services.56 The most important consequence of an unprotected strike 
is that an employer may dismiss the strikers. However, the dismissal must be both 
substantively and procedurally fair.57  
2.2.4 The right to strike 
As mentioned above, the right to strike is granted by both the Constitution and the LRA, and 
the way in which the right to strike is expressed in each is shown below.  
The right to strike is enshrined in section 23 (2) (c) of the Constitution, which provides that 
“every worker has the right to strike.”58 The right is granted without express limitation. 
However, just like every other right in the Constitution, it is not absolute and remains subject 
                                                          
53 Chicktay (note 49 above) 268. 
54 Cohen (note 29 above) 45. 
55 Ibid  
56 Section 65 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
57 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
58 Section 23 (2) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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to the limitations clause contained in section 36.59 In this regard, the LRA was enacted to give 
effect to the right to strike, but also to limit the right to strike, as explained below.   
The two main strike provisions in the LRA are sections 64 and 65. Section 64 grants 
employees the right to strike and employers the corresponding recourse to lock-out.60 It 
further sets out the procedures that must be followed in order for the strike to be protected. 
On the other hand, section 65 deals with the limitations on the right to strike and recourse to 
lock-out respectively.  
The difference between the right to strike in section 23 (2) (c) of the Constitution and section 
64 of the LRA, is that in the former it is granted to every worker, whereas in the latter it is 
granted to every employee.61 Thus, the Constitution provides for a wider scope of inclusion of 
persons in the right to strike, than the narrower scope of inclusion contained in the LRA. As 
defined in the LRA, a person need not be an employee in order to enjoy the right to strike; 
they merely need to be a worker. 
Upon the enactment of the LRA, sections 64 and 65 serve amongst other things, as 
amendments to the common law position that an employee who embarks on a strike commits 
a fundamental breach of his employment contract, entitling the employer to terminate the 
employment contract immediately.62 The legislature’s abolition of this common law position 
can be seen as an attempt to balance or at least reduce the unequal power relations between 
employers and employees. 
 Having dealt with the right to strike, the chapter now deals with the limitations on the right 
to strike.  
 
 
                                                          
59 Manamela (note 4 above) 334. 
60 A lock-out is defined in section 213 of the LRA as the exclusion by an employer of employees from the 
employer’s workplace, for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer breached those employees’ 
contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of that exclusion. 
61 The term ‘worker’ is not defined either in the Constitution or the LRA, whereas an ‘employee’ is defined in 
section 213 of the LRA as (a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or 
for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in any 
manner assists in carrying on or conducting business of an employer.  
62 J Grogan ‘Strike Dismissals in the Public Sector’ (1991) 12 ILJ 1. 
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2.2.5 Limitations on the right to strike  
Apart from the general limitation contained in section 36 of the Constitution,63 the LRA 
restricts the right to strike by requiring pre-strike procedures, prohibiting strike action over 
certain issues in dispute and prohibiting certain employees from striking.  These are all 
discussed in turn. 
In order for a strike or lock-out to be protected, certain requirements must be satisfied. The 
purpose of the statutory pre-strike procedures is to provide the parties with an opportunity for 
conciliation and possible settlement of the dispute. It is also to allow the employer to prepare 
for any possible industrial action that may take place.64 The procedural requirements are as 
follows:  
Referral of the dispute for conciliation: 
The issue in dispute must have been referred for conciliation to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) or the relevant bargaining council.65 It is 
imperative that all the issues that are in dispute are listed in the referral, since workers are 
only permitted to strike over those issues which have been referred for conciliation. In the 
event that there is a dispute about whether the dispute is strikeable, the court, in its attempt to 
identify the real nature of the dispute, is not limited to the way in which the dispute was 
described in the referral or the certificate of outcome. The union is the only party that needs 
to be cited in the referral.66 
                                                          
63 This section is referred to as the ‘limitations clause’ and it provides the following:  
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of the law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2. Except as provided for in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
64 Cohen (note 29 above) 49.  
65 Section 64 (1) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
66 Cohen (note 29 above) 49. 
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In Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) and others,67 the 
company had farming-and-processing divisions. When employees from the processing plant 
embarked on a strike for a wage increase, their fellow employees in the farming division also 
embarked on a strike for a wage increase. Both demands were the same.68 The Labour Appeal 
Court held that since only the dispute of the processing plant employees had been referred for 
conciliation, the strike of the farm workers for a wage increase was unprotected. However, to 
the extent that the individual workers’ participation in the strike was in support of demands 
relating only to the union members based in the processing plant, such participation was 
lawful and protected.69  
Obtaining a certificate of outcome: 
The CCMA must provide a certificate stating that the issue remains unresolved, in other 
words, a certificate of outcome.70 If 30 days (calculated from the date the CCMA or council 
received the referral) has elapsed, then a certificate of outcome may be obtained without 
waiting for a conciliation hearing.71 However, it is best to wait for conciliation so that any 
disagreement about the nature of the dispute, or any claim that the dispute is not a strikeable 
one, may be rectified before the union proceeds with the following step.72 
If the dispute concerns a ‘refusal to bargain’,73 the union must wait for the conciliation 
hearing to obtain an advisory arbitration award from the CCMA, or council, before it can 
move on to the next step.74 The union is not bound by the advisory arbitration award. 
However, if it turns out that the strike was unprotected, the advice given in the award may be 
useful when the court assesses whether any disciplinary action was taken by the union in 
response to the unprotected strike.75  
                                                          
67 Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and others (2004) 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC). 
68 Cohen (note 29 above) 49. 
69 Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd (note 67 above) 48. See also Cohen (note 29 above) 50. 
70 Section 64 (1) (a) (i) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
71 Section 64 (1) (a) (ii) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
72 Cohen (note 29 above) 50. 
73 A refusal to bargain  includes: 
(a) A refusal: (i) to recognise a trade union as a collective bargaining agent; or (ii) to agree to establish a 
bargaining council. 
(b) A withdrawal of recognition of a collective bargaining agent. 
(c) A resignation of a party from a bargaining council. 
(d) A dispute about: (i) appropriate bargaining units; (ii) appropriate bargaining levels; or (iii) bargaining 
subjects. 
74 Section 64 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
75 Cohen (note 29 above) 50. 
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Sending written notice to the employer of the commencement date of the strike  
The union must notify the employer in writing as to when the strike will begin. In the case of 
a proposed strike, the union must give the employer at least 48 hours’ notice of the 
commencement of the strike.76 If the employer is the State, then the notice must be given to 
the State at least seven days before the strike begins.77 In the event that there is a secondary 
strike, such strikers must give their employers seven days’ notice of the secondary strike. 
This will enable the employer of the secondary strikers to prepare for the strikers’ absence 
from work.78 If the dispute concerns a collective agreement, written notice must be given to 
the relevant bargaining council.79 On the other hand, if the employer is a member of an 
employers’ organisation, written notice must be given to the employers’ organisation.80 
In South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union (SATAWU) and others v Moloto NO 
and another,81 the company employed persons who were members of SATAWU and others 
who were not. SATAWU had issued a single strike notice and some non-members 
participated in the strike. The non-members were dismissed for unauthorised absence from 
work. The Constitutional Court found that the provisions of section 64 envisage only one 
strike in respect of one dispute or issue in dispute. It further found that section 64 does not 
appear to suggest that more than one notice in relation to the single strike is necessary.82 The 
Constitutional Court held that the dismissed strikers met the provisions of section 64 (1) (b) 
of the Act by engaging in a strike when only SATAWU (and not also its non-members) 
issued a strike notice.  
In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware and another v National Construction 
Building and Allied Workers Union (NCBAWU) and others,83 the union had referred a dispute 
to the CCMA concerning the payment of wages during an early work stoppage. Thereafter, it 
notified the company that a strike would begin at any time after 48 hours from the date of the 
notice. The Labour Appeal Court held that the provisions of section 64 (1) (b) of the LRA 
needed to be interpreted and applied in a way that gave best effect to the primary objects of 
                                                          
76 Section 64 (1) (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
77 Section 64 (1) (d) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
78 Cohen (note 29 above) 50. 
79 Section 64 (1) (b) (i) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
80 Section 64 (1) (b) (ii) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
81 SATAWU and others v Moloto NO and another (2012) 33 ILJ 2549 (CC). 
82 Ibid 64. 
83 Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware and another v NCBAWU and others [1997] 6 BLLR 697 
(LAC). 
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the LRA and its own specific purpose, which needed to be done within the constraints of the 
language used in section 64 (1) (b). The Court stated that one of the primary objects of the 
LRA is to promote orderly collective bargaining. Section 64 (1) (b) gives expression to this 
object by requiring written notice of the commencement of the proposed strike. The section’s 
specific purpose is to give the employer advance warning of the proposed strike so that the 
employer may prepare for the power play that will follow. The specific purpose is defeated if 
the written notice does not inform the employer of the exact time in which the proposed strike 
will begin. The Court found the union’s notice defective for failing to stipulate the exact time 
that the proposed strike would begin, and held that the provisions of section 64 (1) (b) were 
not complied with.84 
There are certain instances in which union will be exempt from complying with the pre-strike 
procedures contained in section 64 (1). These instances are dealt with below. 
A union does not have to comply with the above statutory pre-strike procedures in the 
following instances: (a) where the parties to the dispute are members of a bargaining council 
and the dispute has been dealt with by that bargaining council in accordance with its 
constitution85; (b) where the strike or lock-out is in line with the procedures in a collective 
agreement86; (c) where the employees strike in response to a lock-out (by their employer) that 
does not comply with the provisions of Chapter 4 of the LRA87; (d) where the employer 
locks-out its employees in response to their taking part in a strike that does not comply with 
the provisions of Chapter 488; or (e) where the employer fails to comply with the 
requirements of subsections 489 and 590.91 
                                                          
84 Ibid 702. See also Cohen (note 29 above) 51. 
85 Section 64 (3) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
86 Section 64 (3) (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
87 Section 64 (3) (c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
88 Section 64 (3) (d) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
89 Subsection 4 provides that any employee or any trade union that refers a dispute about a unilateral change to 
terms and conditions of employment to a bargaining council or the CCMA in terms of subsection 1 (a) of 
section 64 may, in the referral, and for the period referred to in subsection 1 (a): (a) require the employer not to 
implement unilaterally the change to terms and conditions of employment; or (b) if the employer has already 
implemented the change unilaterally, require the employer to restore the terms and conditions of employment 
that applied before the change.   
90 Subsection 5 provides that the employer must comply with a requirement in terms of subsection 4 within 48 
hours of service of the referral on the employer.    
91 Section 64 (3) (e) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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Having dealt with the procedural limitations on the right to strike, or the pre-strike procedures 
that have to be complied with, the chapter now deals with the substantive limitations on the 
right to strike.  
Section 65 firstly prohibits strikes over certain disputes or issues in dispute, and secondly it 
prohibits certain employees from embarking on strike action. These limitations are each 
discussed in turn. 
The Prohibition of strikes over certain issues in dispute: 
Employees may not strike if they are bound by a collective agreement that: (a) has a peace 
clause that prohibits strike action over the issue in dispute;92 (b) regulates the issue in dispute; 
or (c) requires the issue in dispute to be arbitrated.93 
In Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) and others v Asoka Hotel,94 the parties fell under the 
jurisdiction of an Industrial Council and were bound by the terms of a gazetted Industrial 
Council agreement which set minimum wages. The union demanded that the employer 
negotiate with it over wage increases. The employer refused to do so and the union members 
engaged in a strike in furtherance of their demand. The employees were dismissed and sought 
their reinstatement in terms of the LRA. The Industrial Court held that the demand for 
negotiations over higher wages was not covered by any provision of the Industrial Council 
agreement (which set minimum wages only) and that consequently the strike contravened 
section 65 (1) (a) of the LRA.95 The Court held further that it would protect employees who 
engaged in legal strikes in circumstances where the employer neither negotiated in good faith 
nor had proven to be reasonable. In the circumstances of the case, the Court found that the 
employer had dismissed the strikers prematurely and in a way that was procedurally unfair.96 
 In Leoni Wiring Systems (East London) Pty Ltd v NUMSA and others,97 the employees who 
were NUMSA members wanted to embark on a strike for better severance pay, following the 
employer’s implementation of a retrenchment exercise in terms of the LRA. The Labour 
Court held that the collective agreement did not establish a minimum entitlement, but an 
                                                          
92 Section 65 (1) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
93 Section 65 (1) (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
94 BAWU and others v Asoka Hotel (1989) 10 ILJ 167 (IC). 
95 Ibid 173. 
96 Asoka Hotel (note 94 above) 180. 
97 (2007) 28 ILJ 642 (LC). 
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actual one in respect of severance pay. Therefore, the collective agreement regulated the issue 
of severance pay and the employees could not strike for better severance pay.98 
In Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and others,99 the company had farming-and- 
processing divisions. When employees from the processing plant embarked on a strike for a 
wage increase, their fellow workers in the farming division also went on strike for a wage 
increase for themselves. The Labour Appeal Court held that because they were bound by a 
collective agreement with the union, the farm workers were not entitled to strike over wage 
demands on their own behalf.100 
In Airport Handling Services (Pty) Ltd v Transport and Omnibus Workers Union (TOWU) 
and others,101 the company applied for an interdict to prevent its employees from continuing 
to embark on a protected strike, prior to entering into an agreement with the company. The 
Labour Court held that since the agreement was entered into between the company and the 
union, it was a collective agreement. Thus, the employees were obliged to discontinue their 
strike. This was despite a vote by the majority of them in favour of the strike, pending 
negotiations between the company and the union.102  
If employees embark on a strike where there is an agreement that states that the particular 
type of issue in dispute must be referred to arbitration, such a strike will be unprotected.103 
Further, once a dispute has been taken to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrator is final and 
no party is allowed to strike in order to obtain a different result.104 Section 65 (1) (c) of the 
LRA prohibits parties from embarking on a strike to resolve a dispute that such party has a 
right to refer to arbitration or the Labour Court.105 The reason for this is that the dispute is 
one that can be taken to court and an appropriate remedy can be granted. Thus, the disputes 
over which employees may not strike are: allegations of unfair dismissal; automatically unfair 
dismissals; unfair labour practices; victimization; the interpretation and application of a 
collective agreement; picketing; agency and closed shop agreements; and admission or 
                                                          
98 Ibid 40. See also Cohen (note 29 above) 54. 
99 (2004) 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC).  
100 Cohen (note 29 above) 54. 
101 Airport Handling Services (Pty) Ltd v TOWU and others [2004] 3 BLLR 228 (LC). 
102 Ibid 8. 
103 Cohen (note 29 above) 55. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Section 65 (1) (c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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expulsion from bargaining councils.106 These are all the issues in dispute over which the LRA 
prohibits striking. 
Having dealt with the first prohibition under section 65, namely strikes over certain disputes 
or issues in dispute, the chapter now deals with the second prohibition, namely employees 
who are prohibited from embarking on strike action. 
There are only two kinds of employees who are prohibited by the LRA from embarking on 
strike action; namely employees of essential services or maintenance services. In South 
African Police Service (SAPS) v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU),107 the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the rulings of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court that 
only members of the SAPS employed under the SAPS Act are engaged in an essential service 
under the LRA, not all members of a trade union who are not also members of the SAPS. 
In addition to the two limitations identified in section 65 that have been discussed above, 
there are three further limitations on the right to strike that have been read into the LRA by 
case law, as discussed below: 
When the demand requires the employer to act unlawfully: 
In TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd and others v NUMSA and others,108 the employees embarked on a 
strike after the company had refused to dismiss the company supervisor upon the request of 
the employees. The employees alleged that the supervisor made a racist comment to some of 
the employees. The Labour Appeal Court held that the strike was unprotected because the 
demand of the employees required the employer to violate the supervisor’s right to not be 
dismissed without a hearing.109  
When the demand requires the employer to act unreasonably: 
In Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v Independent Municipal and 
Allied Trade Union (IMATU) and another,110 the union demanded the employer to secure the 
jobs of its employees who were transferred in terms of section 197 of the LRA. The Council 
claimed that the demand was impossible to satisfy and that the strike embarked on by the 
                                                          
106 Cohen (note 29 above) 55. 
107 SAPS v POPCRU (2011) 32 ILJ 1603 (CC). 
108 TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd and others v NUMSA and others (2006) 27 ILJ 1483 (LAC). 
109 Cohen (note 29 above) 57. 
110 Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v IMATU and another [2001] 9 BLLR 1063 (LC). 
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union and its members was unprotected.111 The Labour Court held that the union’s failure to 
specifically identify essential service employees in the strike notice did not render the strike 
unprotected.112 Further, the dispute could not be referred to the Labour Court for 
adjudication, as the union had not alleged that the transfers contravened the LRA. Instead, the 
dispute could be resolved through collective bargaining.113 
Demands with which an employer cannot deal: 
In Mzeku and others v Volkswagen SA (PTY) Ltd and others,114 some of the employees 
embarked on a strike in the form of withholding their labour. Later, some of the employees 
returned to work whilst others did not, and the company dismissed those who failed to return 
to work. The Labour Appeal Court held that under the LRA, the relief of reinstatement is not 
competent in the case of a dismissal that is unfair solely because the employer did not follow 
a fair procedure. Therefore, the strike was unprotected because it concerned a demand that 
the employer was not empowered by law to satisfy.115 
Since the right to strike is a fundamental right of workers granted in the Constitution without 
express limitation,116 it is important that any limitations on the right to strike be justified.if 
this were not so, employees would have no effective weapon against employers who would 
remain considerably financially and socially more powerful than their employees. Thus, as a 
way of clarifying that the limitations on the right to strike do not taint this right, or render it 
less valuable, the Constitutional Court in South African National Defence Union (SANDU) v 
Minister of Defence and others117 found that the limitations on the right to strike passed 





                                                          
111 Cohen (note 29 above) 57. 
112 Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (note 110 above) 43. 
113 Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (note 110 above) 33, 47. 
114 (2001) 22 ILJ 1575 (LAC). 
115 Ibid 79. See also Cohen (note 29 above) 58. 
116 Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
117 SANDU v Minister of Defence and others (2007) 28 ILJ 1909 (CC). 
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2.3 Conclusion  
In summary, a strike is a refusal to work by a collection of workers or employees. The refusal 
to work is aimed at remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute. The dispute must be in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee. Further, a strike 
can be either primary or secondary. The right to strike is provided for in both section 23 of 
the Constitution and in section 64 of the LRA. The scope for persons who are eligible to 
strike is wider in the Constitution than it is in the LRA, as the Constitution refers to every 
worker whereas the LRA refers to every employee. Section 64 contains the procedural 
requirements that must be followed in order for a strike to be protected, whereas section 65 
explains the substantive limitations on the right to strike. These include both the issues in 
dispute over which employees are prohibited from strike and those employees who are 
prohibited from striking. If there is to be any development to strike laws in South Africa, it is 
imperative that the right to strike and its limitations be respected by both employers and 
employees. Chapter 3, which follows, deals with the legal mechanisms an employer can use, 
or the steps an employer can take to minimise and/or regulate violence by employees during 












Page | 21  
 
Chapter 3: The different legal mechanisms an employer can use, 
or the legal steps an employer can take to try to prevent, minimise 
and/or regulate violence during strikes 
3.1 Introduction 
It can be assumed that employers aim to create healthy, tolerable relationships with their 
employees and vice versa, as this benefits both parties to the employment relationship. 
However, despite this mutual understanding, it is commonly known that the employment 
relationship is never always smooth. Disputes about wages or dismissals can often lead to 
industrial action, accompanied by violence.118 Thus, it is important for employers to have 
ways preventing violence during strikes, or if violence does occur, to try and minimise the 
violence or any adverse effects it could have. As soon as a protected strike becomes violent, it 
loses its legitimacy.119 Therefore, in order to prevent this, it is crucial that a strike is 
embarked upon peacefully and in accordance with the procedures set out in section 64 of the 
LRA.120 This chapter discusses the different mechanisms an employer can use to minimise 
and/or prevent violence during strikes. These are as follows: concluding collective 
agreements; agreeing to and complying with the rues of picketing; obtaining a prohibitory 
interdict; instituting a delictual claim for damages; and laying a charge of misconduct. Each 
one is dealt with in turn. 
3.2 The formation of proper relationships with employees through 
collective agreements 
The first way that employers can try to minimise violence during strikes is by concluding 
collective agreements that will regulate the relationship between them and their employees. 
This is usually considered as the first option by employers because it is a diplomatic way of 
trying to prevent the occurrence of strikes, and if strikes are prevented then violence is 
prevented too. The reason collective agreements can prevent strikes is because they stipulate 
                                                          
118 Manamela (note 4 above) 322. 
119 A Rycroft ‘Can a Protected Strike Lose its Status? Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of 
SA Workers Union & others (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC)’ (2013) 34 ILJ 821, 827. 
120 Manamela (note 4 above) 323. 
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the forum(s)121 that could be used to resolve a dispute between the employer and employees, 
and the issues in dispute over which employees cannot strike. The two different kinds of 
collective agreements that are provided for by the LRA are addressed below. 
a. Agency shop agreements 
An agency shop agreement is provided for in section 25 (1) of the LRA and is concluded 
between a majority union and an employer. In terms of this agreement, the employer deducts 
an agreed fee from the wages of non-union members, who are eligible for membership.122 
This is to ensure that non-unionised employees also contribute financially towards the 
enjoyment of any benefits received by the entire workforce. Such benefits are a result of 
negotiations entered into by the majority union, on behalf of its members, with the 
employer.123 A conscientious objector (that is, a person who refuses to join a trade union 
because of his conscience) is not obliged to become a member of a trade union and may 
request that his fees be paid to a fund administered by the Department of Labour.124 
In terms of section 25 (3), an agency shop agreement is binding only if it provides the 
following:125 (a) employees who are not members of the representative trade union are not 
compelled to become members of that trade union; (b) the agreed agency fee must be 
equivalent to or less than: (i) the amount of the subscription payable by the members of the 
representative trade union; (ii) if the subscription of the representative trade union is 
calculated as a percentage of an employee’s salary, that percentage; (iii) if there are two or 
more trade unions who are party to the agreement, the highest amount of the subscription that 
would apply to an employee; (c) the amount deducted must be paid into a separate account 
administered by the representative trade union; (d) no agency fee deducted may be: (i) paid to 
a political party as an affiliation fee; (ii) contributed in cash or kind to a political party or a 
person standing for election to any political office; or (iii) used for any expenditure that does 
not advance or protect the socio-economic interest of employees. 
 
                                                          
121 Collective agreements usually state that disputes will be resolved through internal (workplace) dispute 
resolution processes. The employer’s exclusion of dispute resolution processes outside those provided for in the 
workplace is a way of avoiding the magnification of the issue or dispute, which could lead to (violent) industrial 
action. 
122 Section 25 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
123 Cohen (note 29 above) 6. 
124 Section 25 (4) (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
125 Section 25 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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b. Closed shop agreements 
A closed shop agreement is provided for in section 26 (1) of the LRA and is concluded 
between an employer and a trade union. In terms of this agreement, if two thirds of the 
employer’s total workforce votes in favour of being a member of a union of their choice, then 
the entire workforce (including those employees who voted against union membership) have 
to become union members.126 If there are any employees who do not become union members, 
they are dismissed and such dismissal is not regarded as unfair.127  
A closed shop agreement is binding only in the following circumstances:128 (a) a ballot 
concerning the employees to be covered by the agreement, has been held; (b) two thirds of 
the employees who voted have voted in favour of the agreement; (c) there is no provision in 
the agreement requiring membership of the representative trade union before employment 
commences; and (d) it provides that no membership subscription or levy deducted may be: (i) 
paid to a political party as an affiliation fee; (ii) contributed in cash or kind to a political party 
or a person standing for election to any political office; or (iii) used for any expenditure that 
does not advance or protect the socio-economic interest of employees.  
The subject of closed shop agreements is one that is highly controversial in South African 
labour law and amongst its scholars. Many do not agree with the way closed shop agreements 
operate and the effect of non-compliance with them, on employees. Hayek believes that 
closed shop agreements should be regarded as restraints of trade and that they should not 
enjoy the benefit of protection by the law.129 Vettori argues that closed shop agreements 
violate an employee’s right to freedom of association130 (which is guaranteed by the 
International Labour Organisation and section 18 of the Constitution). This is in the sense 
that an employee does not have the freedom not to associate with any trade union, where two 
thirds of the employer’s workforce has voted in favour of joining a trade union of their 
choice.  
                                                          
126 Section 26 (1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
127 Section 26 (6) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
128 Section 26 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
129 M Budeli Freedom of Association and Trade Unionism in South Africa: from Apartheid to the Democratic 
Constitutional Order (PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2007) 61 available at 
http://uctscholar.uct.ac.za/PDF/158331_Budeli_M.pdf, accessed on 11 July 2014.  
130 S Vettori ‘The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Protection of Trade Unions’ (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 
297. 
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Budeli argues that although there is no legislation that specifically provides for ‘freedom not 
to associate’, the right to freedom of association in the Constitution should be interpreted to 
mean that a person also has the right to choose whether or not they wish to associate with a 
trade union or an employer’s organisation.131 Van der Merwe shares the same view as Budeli 
that closed shop agreements may be unconstitutional and that although section 18 expressly 
grants a positive right of freedom of association, it should be understood to also include the 
negative right of freedom not to associate.132 He argues that such an interpretation or 
understanding of the right is consistent with section 39 (2) of the Constitution, which states 
that “a right in the Bill of rights should be interpreted in a way that promotes the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”133 
He argues further, as does Budeli, that regard must be given to international law and foreign 
law, as per section 39 (2) of the Constitution and that the inclusion of the “negative right” is 
consistent with international law (such as the ILO) and foreign law (jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom, where the courts have been progressive in their approach to the right to 
freedom of association).134  
However, Budeli notes that the ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are silent on the specific issue of 
whether the right to freedom of association includes the negative right not to associate.135 
Despite this, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association held that “when interpreting 
Convention No 87, although [it] does not explicitly refer to the right to dissociate, the general 
right to dissociate is included in the right to associate.”136  
The author of this dissertation agrees with the abovementioned authors that closed shop 
agreements violate the right to freedom of association. Whether it is not in the best interests 
of the employer and/or a majority trade union if employees do not join a union of their choice 
is not the concern of the employees and should thus not affect them. Employees who do not 
wish to join trade unions should be left to face the normal consequences of non-union 
membership, such as not being part of a collective bargaining process with the employer, and 
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will have no union to represent them should any dispute arise between them and their 
employer.137 It is unfortunate that there is not a lot of jurisprudence on closed shop 
agreements, considering their controversial nature.  
One obvious reason for this is that trade unions are reluctant to challenge the constitutionality 
of section 26 (1) of the LRA. This is understandable from their perspective, as a successful 
challenge of the section means that they could lose members and in the case of minority 
unions, probably even cease to exist. This is because employees would no longer be 
compelled to join trade unions of their choice and thus pay monthly subscription fees. 
Another obvious reason is that employers are not challenging the constitutionality of the 
section. Perhaps this is because employers also prefer that unions exist rather than not exist. 
This could be because they prefer to deal with union officials and shop stewards rather than 
with their employees directly. Some employers may believe that they can persuade union 
officials and shop stewards to reach settlements that do not have adverse effects on the 
business of the employer, in exchange for an office in the workplace and/or a secret wage 
increase.138 On the other hand, dissatisfied employees are less likely to be persuaded to 
consider the employer’s interests and are thus more likely to be hostile towards the 
employer.139  
This view is substantiated by Gavin Capps in an interview with Amandla newspaper in 
September 2012. The issue for that month dealt with the Marikana tragedy (as it had recently 
occurred) and the way the police handled it. When asked: “what has happened with the 
National Union of Metalworkers (NUM)? It seems workers have rejected NUM to strike 
independently and join the rival union, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction 
Union (AMCU)”140, Capps replied:  
When I did field research in the industry in [the years] 2000-1, in the Bafokeng area, I was 
struck by the degree of alienation of ordinary workers. In a relatively short time they had 
started feeling that NUM no longer represented them effectively. This could be attributed to 
the fact that, [amongst other things], after NUM’s recognition struggles, the [mine] bosses 
employed various strategies to develop closer relations with the local union leadership. They 
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139 Ibid. 
140 Jolys (note 14 above) 9. 
Page | 26  
 
realised that union incorporation was better than a force like NUM rather than facing 
autonomous worker action with which one cannot negotiate and reach compromises.141  
Capps cited a practical example by noting that at the Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 
mines, the union office is right next to the mine manager’s office. He further stated that 
“managers fostered strategies of socialising with NUM leaders (both organisers and senior 
shop stewards) and this generated a feeling amongst workers that grievances were not being 
taken up [to the mine management].”142   
This is proof of the increasingly close (and perhaps inappropriate) relationship between mine 
management and union officials and shop stewards. Such relationships are to the detriment of 
the mine workers, particularly lower graded mine workers (such as rock drill operators). This 
is because their best interests cannot possibly be served by the unions, who are ‘in bed’ with 
mine management with more lucrative offers than any mine worker could ever meet. 
Having said all this, one must neither forget nor understate the crucial role played by trade 
unions in society. Gericke notes the importance of trade unions as follows: 
Trade unions are invaluable institutions in modern democratic society. Their administrative 
and legal skills are priceless in the collective bargaining process; and so is the degree of 
accuracy and commitment to their responsibilities and obligations to serve the interests of 
their members, to preserve their dignity and to better their conditions of employment and 
standard of living. They provide an essential counterbalance to the power of management 
during negotiations. They are the vigilant custodians, not only of their members’ interests but 
of the economy, the labour market and society at large. They guard over the rights of their 
members in the workplace and play a significant role in maintaining the dignity and interests 
of minority groups and previously disadvantaged members of a society. Fair and justified 
dismissals due to unlawful behaviour and/or unprotected strikes are not serving the interests 
of employees in a country that is still deeply deprived of employment opportunities and 
divided by poverty.143 
The subject of trade unions (particularly their liability) will be dealt with in more detail in 
chapter 5 of the dissertation. 
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The legal effect of a collective agreement  
A collective agreement binds the following persons:144 (a) the parties to the collective 
agreement; (b) each party to the collective agreement and the members of every other party to 
the collective agreement, in so far as the provisions are applicable between them; (c) the 
members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a registered 
employers’ organisation that are party to the collective agreement if the collective agreement 
regulates: (i) the terms and conditions of employment; or (ii) the conduct of the employers in 
relation to their employees or the conduct of the employees in relation to their employers; (d) 
employees who are not members of the registered trade union(s) party to the agreement if: (i) 
the employees are identified in the agreement; (ii) the agreement expressly binds the 
employees; (iii) that trade union or those trade unions have as their members the majority of 
employees employed by the employer in the workplace. 
A collective agreement binds for the whole period of the collective agreement every person 
bound in terms of subsection (1) (c) who was a member at the time it became binding. This is 
so whether or not that person continues to be a member of the registered trade union or 
registered employers’ organisation for the duration of the collective agreement.145 Further, a 
collective agreement, where applicable, changes any contract of employment between an 
employer and employee who are both bound by the collective agreement.146 Unless the 
collective agreement provides otherwise, any party to a collective agreement that is 
concluded for an indefinite period of time may terminate the agreement by giving reasonable 
notice in writing to the other parties.147   
Recognition agreements 
Recognition agreements are not provided for in the LRA. They are concluded between the 
employer and a trade union where the employer agrees to recognise a trade union in the 
workplace if the trade union has a sufficient percentage of members in the employer’s 
                                                          
144 Section 23 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
145 Section 23 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
146 Section 23 (3) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
147 Section 23 (4) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
Page | 28  
 
workforce, in terms of the collective agreement concluded between the employer and the 
majority union.148  
Collective agreements and Majoritarianism 
Majoritarianism is a principle of labour law that refers to the situation whereby members of a 
trade union constitute the majority of an employer’s workforce.149 It is referred to in section 
11 of the LRA, as ‘trade union representativeness’, which means a registered trade union or 
two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, and that are sufficiently representative of 
the employees employed by an employer in the workplace.  
As per section 18 (1) of the LRA, such a majority union, together with the employer, have the 
right to conclude a collective agreement which sets a threshold for member representivity of 
the employer’s workforce, which must be met by a trade union. This is in order to be 
recognised as a trade union with the benefit of the organisational rights that accompany such 
recognition, in terms of sections 12150, 13151 and 15152 of the LRA.153 
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The impact of section 18 of the LRA on minority unions 
Section 18 creates many obstacles for minority unions. If a union does not meet the threshold 
set by the employer and the majority union, they are not recognised as a trade union and do 
not have the benefit of the organisational rights sections 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. Even if a 
trade union meets the threshold, the employer and the majority union may, in a new 
collective agreement, upon the expiry of the old one, increase the threshold for sufficient 
representivity.154 The effect of this is that the minority unions are sometimes unable to meet 
the new threshold because they have not gained further members from the employer’s 
workforce, and consequently lose the organisational rights in sections 12, 13 and 15 of the 
LRA.155 The members of the minority unions who have lost those organisational rights see 
not point in continuing their membership with a union that lacks organisational rights. As a 
result, they join the majority union.156  
Further, the employer and a majority union may conclude a collective agreement which 
deprives minority trade unions of the right to organise on the shop floor.157 Probably one of 
the greatest problems as far as the content of collective agreements is concerned, is that the 
LRA generally allows collective agreements to trump its provisions.158 For example, section 
64 (1) (a) prohibits a strike where a collective agreement determines that the issue in dispute 
is not strikeable.  
Another obstacle is that minority trade unions and their employees together with employees 
who do not belong to any trade union are bound by the terms of the collective agreement. In 
POPCRU v Ledwaba NO and others,159 a dispute arose between POPCRU (the majority trade 
union in the department of correctional services) and the South African Correctional services 
Workers Union (SACOSWU), (a minority union in the department of correctional services) 
about whether SACOSWU was entitled to the organisational rights contemplated in sections 
12 and 13 of the LRA.  
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The Labour Court stated that because POPCRU is a recognised majority union and because 
the department of correctional services had already concluded a collective agreement with 
POPCRU determining threshold representativeness and organisational rights, which were 
binding on non-parties, the department of correctional services and SACOSWU were not 
entitled to conclude a collective agreement on organisational rights.160 The Labour Court 
remarked further that to apply the SACOSWU collective agreement would negate and breach 
the POPCRU collective agreements. Further that this would be in conflict with sections 18 
(1) and 23 (1) (d) of the LRA, in terms of which SACOSWU and/or its individual members 
would be bound by the POPCRU collective agreements.161 Thus, the Labour Court found the 
SACOSWU agreement to be invalid and unenforceable.   
In Chamber of Mines South Africa v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU),162 the Labour Court had to make a decision on the return date of a rule nisi that it 
granted in favour of the employer prohibiting the union from embarking on a strike. The 
union filed a counter-application challenging the constitutionality of section 23 (1) (d) of the 
LRA.163 The Court found that the limitation of the right to strike by AMCU’s members is 
applicable regarding only those issues regulated by the wage agreement and only for so long 
as the agreement remains binding. The Court stated that the limitation is consistent with the 
overall legislative scheme that applies to collective bargaining and the LRA. It held that 
section 23 (1) (d) of the LRA read with the other relevant sections of the LRA (section 65 (1) 
(a)) does not violate the principle of legality and constitutes a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation of the right to strike and other associated rights (namely the rights to: freedom of 
association; freedom of trade, occupation and profession; fair labour practices and human 
dignity).164 Thus, section 23 (1) (d) of the LRA was held to be consistent with the 
Constitution. These two judgments are indicative of how even the Labour Court endorses the 
principle of majoritarianism and the enormous weight it attaches to the validity of collective 
agreements.  
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The collective agreement may stipulate that the parties resolve the dispute in the following 
ways provided below. If not, the employer may suggest that that the dispute be avoided in the 
following ways in order to avoid a strike, which could turn violent. Some examples of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms an employer can use or suggest are: informal 
discussion and problem solving; facilitation; mediation; or negotiation. Each dispute 
resolution mechanism is dealt with briefly in turn. Informal discussion and problem solving 
are simple and traditional ways of relationship building and dispute resolution, involving the 
parties in an exchange of positions, interests and possible solutions, with the aim of reaching 
an understanding or solution to which both parties can agree.165 Facilitation is the process in 
which a facilitator assists parties to reach consensus, by chairing the meeting or guiding 
problem-solving or making suggestions.166 Mediation is a decision making process in which 
the parties are assisted by a third person (the mediator) who attempts to improve the process 
of decision-making and assist the parties to reach an outcome to which both parties can 
agree.167 Negotiation is an interactive communication process that may occur when one party 
seeks something from another or vice versa.168 The parties communicate their needs and 
interests in an attempt to reach a decision or resolve a dispute.169  
3.3 Agreement on and compliance with picketing rules  
Another way that employers could attempt to prevent strike violence is by trying to reach 
agreement with the trade union(s) representing the striking employees, on rules of 
picketing.170 Section 17 of the Constitution grants everyone the right to, amongst other things, 
picket peacefully and unarmed.171 According to the Code of Good Practice on Picketing, a 
picket is “conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike”.172 It could also be understood 
as a gathering of strikers outside the employer’s business premises who discourage or 
dissuade co-workers who are not picketing, from going to work.173 Its purpose, as per the 
Code of Good Practice on Picketing, is to peacefully encourage non-striking employees and 
members of the public to oppose a lock-out or to support strikers involved in a protected 
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strike.174 Picketers are permitted to usually hold placards expressing their demands or 
grievances, and to chant and dance.175 However, a picket may take place on the premises of 
the employer, with the employer’s permission, which may not be unreasonably withheld.176 
The consequence of a picket is that it causes financial strain or loss to the employer, as there 
will be a decrease in production due to the stoppage of work by some employees. Thus, the 
difference between a picket and a strike is that a picket is a step further than a strike. This is 
in the sense that it involves the refusal to work, accompanied by a demonstration where 
strikers hold placards, chant and dance outside the employer’s business premises. On the 
other hand, a strike is the mere refusal to work or withdrawal of labour by workers.177 This is 
without having to express such refusal on the streets by being vocal or dancing or holding 
placards outside the employer’s business premises.  
In NUMSA v Dunlop,178 the company dismissed 250 employees for strike violence. The 
company and the arbitrator accepted that if there had been picketing rules with proper 
marshals keeping people in certain areas and monitoring the conduct of workers, the workers 
would not have been free to march and blockade the access road to the main company, stone 
the workers and vans entering the company, and stone and assault the riot unit located in 
front of the company.179 This shows the important role that picketing rules can play in 
preventing strike violence. 
Although collective agreements aim to prevent strikes, the fact that collective agreements 
bind non-parties and stipulate the issues in dispute over which employees cannot strike, could 
lead to strikes, which could turn violent. Some of the alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation may fail to get the employer and employees to 
reach agreement or resolve a dispute. Further, picketers sometimes do not strictly comply 
with the rules of picketing. Thus, it is necessary for there to be a legal mechanism employers 
can use, or a step they can take when employees have embarked on an unprotected strike. 
This step is applying for and obtaining a prohibitory interdict, and is dealt with in more detail 
below. 
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3.4 Prohibitory interdict 
Section 68 of the LRA empowers the Labour Court with exclusive jurisdiction to interdict 
any person from participating in a strike or lock-out that does not comply with section 64 
(unprotected strike).180 It further empowers the Labour Court to order the payment of just and 
equitable compensation for any loss suffered as a result of an unprotected strike or any 
conduct committed in contemplation or in furtherance of an unprotected strike or lock-out.181 
The Labour Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over labour matters and power to interdict 
unprotected strikes and strike violence is also provided for in sections 157 (1) and 158 (1) of 
the LRA.182 Thus, an employer can obtain an interdict from the Labour Court prohibiting 
employees from committing violence during a protected strike. The interdict will be an 
interim one (rule nisi) and the parties must return on the return date, where the respondent 
union must show cause why the interim order must not be made final.183  
In National Council of SPCA v Open Shore,184 the Supreme Court of Appeal set out the 
factors a court must take into account before granting an interim interdict:185 (a) whether the 
applicant has a prima facie right to claim an interdict. What is required is proof of facts that 
establish the existence of a right in terms of substantive law; (b) the court would normally 
require the applicant to show a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm for the 
interim relief to be granted, and the respondents will need to prove that there was none for the 
court to grant a final order on the return date. A reasonable apprehension of injury has been 
held to be one that a reasonable man might entertain on being faced with certain facts. The 
applicant for an interdict does not have to show that on a balance of probabilities flowing 
from undisputed facts, injury will follow. He is only required to show that it is reasonable to 
apprehend that injury will result. However, the test for apprehension is an objective one. This 
means that based on the facts presented to him, the Judge must decide whether there is any 
basis for the entertainment of a reasonable apprehension by the applicant;186 (c) whether the 
balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim interdict; and (d) whether the 
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applicant has no other satisfactory remedy. If all four questions are answered in the 
affirmative, a court will grant the applicant an interim interdict.   
Although employers sometimes disobey court interdicts, it is most common for strikers to 
disobey them.187 Such an act amounts to contempt of court, since section 165 (5) of the 
Constitution states clearly that orders are binding on the persons to whom they apply.188 Van 
Niekerk cites some examples of the different ways in which strikers respond to strike 
interdicts. He states that some strikers “refuse to accept them, or throw them [on] the ground 
and trample on them.”189 He notes that the increasing disregard for court interdicts is a threat 
to the rule of law.190 The disregard was further reiterated by the Labour Appeal Court in 
Modise and others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath,191 which remarked: “it is becoming 
distressingly obvious that court orders are, by employers and employees alike, not invariably 
treated with the respect they ought to demand.”192 
Myburgh argues that there is little that the Labour Court can do to ensure that strikers comply 
with strike interdicts.193 This is because the crux of the reason underlying strikes, and 
violence during strikes, is the lack of change in the social and economic status of workers.194 
This makes the issue of strikes and strike violence more of a political than legal matter.195 He 
further concurs with Ngcukaitobi that the legislative and executive branches of government 
have a greater role to play in the reduction or eradication of violence during strikes. This is by 
creating a legal framework in which both parties to the employment relationship can 
adequately address their concerns.196 Further, the executive branch of government has a duty 
to implement the laws made by the legislator and ensure that service delivery is effected 
efficiently to citizens.197 The Labour Court merely enforces the laws made by the 
legislator.198  
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Thus, although a prohibitory interdict is one of the mechanisms an employer can use to 
minimise and/or prevent violence during strikes, owing to the increasing disregard for strike 
interdicts, one can concur with Myburgh that “interdicts are now often not worth the paper 
they are written on.”199 Thus, it may be necessary for an employer to take a further legal step 
(such as instituting action and claiming delictual damages) where strike violence results in 
damage to the employer’s property. 
3.5 Delictual claim for damages  
An employer can institute legal action in which he claims for damages in terms of the law of 
delict. A delict can be described as an actionable civil wrong, where one person causes harm 
to another resulting in the latter suffering monetary and/or non-monetary loss.200 The 
employees and the union can be held jointly and severally liable for the damages.201 In 
SATAWU v Garvas,202 private property and property of the City of Cape Town was damaged 
during a strike that was embarked on by members of SATAWU. SATAWU was held liable 
for damages of R1, 5 million. In Mangaung Local Municipality v South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU),203 the employees in the municipality's electrical department 
embarked on an unprotected strike. The employer suffered financial loss, due to the 
employees’ absence from work. The Labour Court held the union liable for the loss 
suffered.204 Although it is the union’s members who commit delicts during strikes, employers 
usually institute action against the union (as case law shows) hoping that a court will hold the 
union liable for its members’ conduct, under the Regulation of Gatherings Act.205 Employers 
do this, instead of instituting action against individual members, due to the obvious reason 
that unions have substantially more money than their members.  
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3.6 Charge for misconduct 
An employer can lay charges for misconduct during a strike (whether or not the strike was 
protected or unprotected). Although an employee commits misconduct by virtue of 
embarking on a strike that does not comply with chapter IV of the LRA, the misconduct 
referred to here relates to those acts that are considered as criminal acts, for example damage 
to property, intimidation and assault. Misconduct during a strike will nullify any legitimacy 
the strike had, and the employer will be in a position to charge the employees with 
misconduct and even dismiss the employees, depending on the degree of the misconduct and 
the circumstances of each case.206 A more comprehensive discussion of misconduct will be 
undertaken in chapter 4 of the dissertation.  
3.7 Conclusion  
In summary, there are four different mechanisms, short of dismissal, that an employer can use 
to minimise and/or regulate violence during a strike. The first is to form proper relationships 
with employees through collective agreements. The different kinds of collective agreements 
provided for in the LRA are agency shop and closed shop agreements. It has been argued that 
there is a lot of controversy surrounding closed shop agreements and that many labour law 
scholars do not favour them and consider them to be either restraints of trade and/or 
unconstitutional. An employer may also conclude a recognition agreement with a minority 
trade union. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and negotiation can 
be used or suggested by an employer to try to avoid strikes, and any possible violence that 
could accompany them. The second mechanism an employer can use to try to prevent, 
minimise and/or regulate strike violence is to agree with recognised trade unions in the 
workplace on picketing rules. If employees fail to comply with picketing rules, or embark on 
an unprotected strike, an employer can obtain a prohibitory interdict from the Labour Court, 
preventing workers from embarking on or continuing to embark on that strike. The author has 
shown that strike interdicts are disobeyed by employers and mostly employees; therefore, 
they are often not worth the paper on which they are written. The fourth mechanism an 
employer can use to try to prevent, minimise and/or regulate strike violence is to institute 
legal action in which the employer claims delictual damages. Lastly, an employer can lay a 
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charge of misconduct against the employees. Chapter 4, which follows, deals with 
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Chapter 4: Misconduct during strikes and dismissal for 
misconduct 
4.1 Introduction  
There are two different kinds of misconduct: firstly, participation in an unprotected strike is 
misconduct,207 and secondly, misconduct occurs where strikers commit criminal and/or 
delictual acts during strikes. Even if a strike is protected, no form of misconduct permitted 
and will inevitably lead to the justified dismissal of employees.208 Misconduct during a strike 
generally involves a number of employees.209 If the misconduct is made up of different acts 
committed at different times and places, separate disciplinary hearings should be conducted 
by the employer,210 or where the misconduct is collective, a group disciplinary hearing can be 
held by the employer.211 Although there are various kinds of misconduct that employees can 
commit during strike action, the most common forms are damage to property, intimidation 
and assault.212 This chapter will discuss these kinds of misconduct in the context of strikes. It 
will further discuss the concepts of derivative misconduct and common purpose, and the way 
the courts have dealt with these concepts. Lastly, the chapter will address dismissals in the 
context of strike action.  
4.2 Malicious Damage to property 
Malicious damage to property is the unlawful and intentional damage to the property of 
another person.213 The damaging of the employer’s property could be the employees’ way of 
expressing their anger towards their employer, and an attempt to set their employer back 
financially.214 This could be more so if the employees believed that the employer is mostly 
concerned about his own economic interests and less so about the employees’ interests.215 
Damage to the employer’s manufacturing or production property could result in a stoppage or 
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decrease in production, depending on the severity of the damage.216 It could also lead to the 
shutting down of the workplace for a certain period of time, which could have an adverse 
impact on the employer’s business and the employees’ job security.217 Since damage to 
property is a criminal offence, an employer can press criminal charges against the employees 
who commit the offence, in addition to using pre-dismissal disciplinary measures or dismissal 
itself.218 However, case law has shown that employers generally do not press criminal 
charges. This is because it is generally difficult to single out and identify the perpetrators of 
criminal acts during strikes involving large numbers of employees,219 and the standard of 
proof is onerous, namely proof beyond reasonable doubt, as opposed to a balance of 
probabilities required in labour law. Where this occurs employers use the concepts of 
derivative misconduct and common purpose against all the strikers (which is dealt with in 
detail below) and/or elect to hold the union liable. For example, in SATAWU v Garvas,220 the 
complainants opted to sue SATAWU who had organised a gathering of thousands of people 
to register its members’ employment-related concerns within the security industry. The 
gathering was the result of a lengthy strike action, in the course of which approximately fifty 
people died and private property and property belonging to the City of Cape Town was 
damaged. The employer did not dismiss the employees because they had embarked on a 
protected strike, but instituted action against the union for riot damage. The Constitutional 
Court held the union liable for damages for the amount claimed of R1, 5 million.  
4.3 Intimidation  
The intimidation that occurs during strike action seems to usually be directed towards the 
non-striking employees by the striking employees.221 This could be a way of showing their 
anger towards the non-striking employees for not joining the strike, and an attempt to get the 
non-striking employees to join the strike.222 This view is supported by a 1992 public service 
striker who remarked: “you know what is frustrating? You are on strike. Others are 
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comfortable, they are eating. But they will also benefit even though they are afraid.”223 
Perhaps the strikers feel that they do all the dirty work, which can have severe consequences 
for them. Yet, the non-strikers will also benefit from the strikers’ efforts if they succeed in 
getting the employer to accede to their demands. Striking employees can also intimidate 
management, as a way of expressing their frustration.224 The intimidation of non-strikers can 
also be a way of showing the employer that although management may be in a better 
bargaining position, the workers have a way of addressing this imbalance, in addition to 
embarking on a strike.225 This is despite the fact that intimidation is illegal. Since intimidation 
is a criminal offence, an employer can press criminal charges against the employees who 
commit the offence, in addition to using pre-dismissal disciplinary measures or dismissal 
itself.226 However, employers generally do not press criminal charges, as it is generally 
difficult to single out and identify the perpetrators of criminal acts during strikes involving 
large numbers of employees.227 Thus, in SATAWU v Maxi Strategic Alliance (Pty) Ltd,228 a 
group of strikers was intimidated into joining the strike by another group of the employer’s 
strikers who had voluntarily embarked on the strike. The employer dismissed the voluntary 
strikers but gave the intimidated strikers a final written warning, as not wanting to embark on 
the strike made them less culpable. The court upheld the dismissal of the voluntary strikers.   
4.4 Assault  
Assault is an unlawful and intentional application of force to a person, or inspiring a belief in 
that person that force will immediately be applied to him.229 Force does not need to involve 
the actual application of physical force, but threats of the application of force may be 
sufficient.230 This could be an extension of intimidation and could occur where the non-
striking employees or management defend themselves by confronting the striking employees 
for their misconduct. This is probably more extreme than damage to property and 
intimidation, and could have more severe legal consequences for the perpetrators. Since 
common assault is a criminal offence, an employer, assaulted employees, or management can 
press criminal charges against the employees who commit the offence, in addition to using 
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pre-dismissal disciplinary measures or dismissal itself.231 However, employers generally do 
not press criminal charges, as it is generally difficult to single out and identify the 
perpetrators of criminal acts during strikes involving large numbers of employees.232 
4.5 Derivative misconduct 
This part of the chapter consists of an explanation of the term ‘derivative misconduct’. It then 
considers case law on derivative misconduct and the important principles that can be 
extracted from the case law. This is followed by an analysis of derivative misconduct and the 
effect it has on employees in the workplace. Lastly, there is a brief explanation of the concept 
of common purpose, and two cases presented, to show how common purpose applies in 
practice.  
The term derivative misconduct was first introduced by the court in Chauke v Lee Service 
Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors.233 It is based on the idea that employees who form part of a 
group that commits misconduct have an obligation to assist the employer to identify the 
perpetrators of the misconduct and the failure to do so can justify their dismissal.234  
Grogan gives a more comprehensive explanation of the term, stating that: 
Derivative misconduct is the term given to an employee’s refusal to divulge information that 
might help his or her employer to identify the perpetrator of some other misconduct. It is 
termed “derivative” because the employee guilty of this form of misconduct is taken to task, 
not for involvement in the primary misconduct, but for refusing to assist the employer in its 
quest to apprehend and discipline the perpetrator(s) of the original offence. Trust thus forms 
the foundation of the relationship between the employer and employee and derivative 
misconduct is founded on this notion. There is no general obligation on employees to share 
information about their colleagues with their employers, but at the very least employees must 
inform their employer if they know that their colleagues are guilty of misconduct which 
warrants disciplinary action.235 
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The above explanation shows that employees’ loyalty should lie more towards their 
employers than their fellow employees. This is because the misconduct of an employee in the 
workplace is an issue in which the employer has a direct interest, as it has adverse effects on 
the employer’s business.  
The way in which derivative misconduct applies in practice, can best be illustrated by looking 
at two popular judgments that have been delivered on the subject: 
 In Chauke v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors,236 the company dismissed the 
employees based on derivative misconduct after several company vehicles were damaged on 
approximately five different occasions, and after all the employees denied responsibility. 
NUMSA approached the Industrial Court for relief claiming that the dismissal of the 
employees was substantively and procedurally unfair. 
Regarding substantive fairness, the Court found that the probabilities pointed 
overwhelmingly to the conclusion that, as a result of the bad relationship that existed with the 
company after dismissal of the NUMSA shop steward for gross negligence, the employees 
decided to embark on some kind of sabotage and decided to collectively remain silent when 
questioned on the incident, relying on the belief that as long as they remained silent, the 
company could not act against them.237 The Court found that the dismissal was substantively 
fair. Regarding procedural fairness, the Court found that the company had done everything 
possible to find out who was responsible for the damages and that the circumstances required 
no more than the collective hearing and the ultimatum. Thus, the company was entitled to 
dismiss the employees and the dismissal was, in the circumstances, procedurally fair.238  
The Labour Appeal Court agreed with the Industrial Court’s finding that the dismissals were 
both substantively and procedurally fair. Regarding substantive fairness, the Court stated that 
the damage to numerous motor vehicles on numerous occasions, which appeared to be some 
form of sabotage to the company, warranted the employees’ dismissal.239 Regarding 
procedural fairness, the Court stated that on numerous occasions, the company gave its 
employees a chance to disclose the identity of those who were responsible for the damages to 
the motor vehicles, but they repeatedly denied responsibility. The company even held a 
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meeting with the NUMSA shop steward to identify the culprits, but to no avail. Therefore, it 
was not necessary to hold individual workplace enquiries before dismissing the workers.240 
In RSA Geological Services (a division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) v Grogan and 
Others,241 the employer dismissed its employees for discarding samples of kimberlite, after it 
had made numerous attempts to discover the identity of the employee who had done so. 
However, the employees collectively refused to assist the employer as they repeatedly denied 
knowing anything about the discarded kimberlite samples. The dispute concerning the 
employees’ unfair dismissal was referred to private arbitration. The arbitrator found the 
dismissal of 10 out of 15 employees to be unfair as the employer failed to prove, on a balance 
of probabilities, that the employees had information that could have assisted the employer in 
identifying the culprits.242 The Labour Court held that in order for the dismissal of a group of 
employees to be justified, in circumstances where the culprits cannot be identified, the 
employer must prove that the employees knew about the misconduct and for no valid reason 
chose not to assist the employer in identifying the culprits.243 
The Court held further that: 
Once the employer established the scale of the scam, that it was perpetrated over a long time 
and during normal working hours, the burden of rebuttal fell to the employees to explain why 
they could not see the sample being discarded, why they could not have known about it, but 
most of all, why they handed back the note with the telephone number for information and 
refused to assist the employer. The evidence for the employer called for an answer which the 
employees were best placed to give. But they refused to testify.244 
The Court was satisfied that the employer had, on a balance of probabilities, and with the 
circumstantial evidence and inferences which the employees failed to rebut, proved that all 
the employees must have had knowledge of the discarding of the sample, or participated in it. 
Venter has identified the following important principles245 that can be extracted from the two 
cases above: (a) employees have a duty to assist an employer in identifying perpetrators of 
misconduct in the workplace; (b) a breach of this duty amounts to a breach of the trust 
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relationship between employer and employee; (c) an employer may charge and dismiss an 
employee for the principal misconduct where the employer is not in a position to identify the 
perpetrators and where the employees refuse to assist the employer in identifying the 
perpetrators; (d) in order for such dismissal to be justified, the employer must prove on a 
balance of probabilities that: (i) principal misconduct was committed by employees in the 
workplace; (ii) the employer has not been able to identify the culprits; (iii) the employees in 
the workplace either participated in or had knowledge of the misconduct. This is proved with 
the assistance of either direct evidence or the drawing of inferences and circumstantial 
evidence; and (iv) despite being granted the opportunity, the employees failed and/or refused 
to assist the employer in identifying the perpetrators of the misconduct; (e) once the employer 
has proved this on a balance of probabilities, the onus shifts to the employees to show that 
either they did not participate in the misconduct or that they had no knowledge of it. If the 
employees fail to discharge this onus, the inference is drawn that the employees either 
participated in or at the very least associated themselves with the perpetrators of the principal 
misconduct.  
4.5.1 Does the concept of derivative misconduct place a heavy burden on 
employees? 
It could be argued that the duty of employees to assist their employer in identifying 
perpetrators of misconduct in the workplace, places a heavy burden on employees to turn 
against their fellow workers. Although an employee aims to create a tolerable working 
relationship with their employer, and although their allegiance lies with the employer before 
anyone else in the workplace, the fact that employees work with each other in the workplace 
will lead them to want to have a healthy and tolerable relationship, as opposed to a hostile 
working relationship. Therefore, from an employee’s perspective, it might not be in their best 
interest to alert the employer when another employee commits misconduct in the workplace. 
This is because dismissal is considered as a last resort,246 and an employee who commits 
misconduct may be given a warning or a suspension, but continues to work for the employer. 
Further, that employee risks being labelled as a ‘sell-out’247 by other employees. The 
possibility of tension amongst the workforce after such an incident cannot be overlooked. 
This could create divisions amongst the workforce and may even have an adverse effect on 
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the rate of production, since workers would not be entirely focussed on the work at hand, but 
also on the politics of the workplace. 
Therefore, it may be best for the employer to employ security guards and video surveillance 
to constantly patrol the workplace to guard against any criminal activity. Nowadays most 
employers engage widespread video and camera surveillance during strikes and have used 
this effectively to identify perpetrators of misconduct. In NUMSA and others v Dunlop,248 the 
employer dismissed a large number of workers for misconduct during a protected strike, the 
employer heavily relied on photographic and video footage to identify many of the 
perpetrators. This way, the employer’s workforce can focus on the work they have been 
employed to do. Further, they will most probably refrain from committing any criminal 
activity if they are aware that there is camera surveillance and people present who are 
specifically employed to guard against any criminal acts within the workplace. Having said 
all this, there may be instances whereby employees are able to get away with misconduct 
without being detected by the employer’s security measures, but by another employee 
instead. In such instances, that employee would be obliged to bring this to the attention of the 
employer.249 Thus, the undeniable fact that employees will always be more aware (than the 
employer) of what the next one is doing, is perhaps one of the major reasons behind the 
incorporation of derivative misconduct into our law, and its wide endorsement by our courts. 
Another concept which is closely related to derivative misconduct and which is used in the 
employment relationship is that of ‘common purpose’, which is dealt with below. 
4.5.2  Common purpose  
The common purpose rule (or ‘doctrine’, as it was formerly known) holds that, where two or 
more people associate together in order to commit a crime, they will each be liable for the 
criminal conduct of the other(s), which falls within their common design. They will be 
regarded as co-perpetrators.250 Their unlawful conduct in such a case consists of their act of 
associating together with a common purpose to commit the crime, which was ultimately 
executed by one of them.251 Where the crime in question is one involving causation (for 
example, murder), it is not necessary for the State to prove that each participant contributed 
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towards causing the prohibited consequence, or even whose actions had actually caused the 
consequence. As a matter of policy, the conduct of each perpetrator is attributed to all the 
others.252 
For example, in S v Mahlangu and others,253 Mahlangu carried out a robbery at a garage 
where two of his accomplices were employed. Mahlangu alleged that the two accomplices 
were integrally involved in planning and executing the robbery. The Court agreed with this 
and convicted them of the robbery on the basis of common purpose, but it held (obiter) that, 
even if they had merely been passive bystanders, as employees they were in a position of 
trust.254 They therefore had a duty to warn their employer of the intended robbery, which they 
knew about. Because their inaction was a breach of this duty, they could equally have been 
held liable as accomplices to Mahlangu.255 
The fact that employees are expected to alert their employer as to any possible criminal 
activity or danger towards the employer’s business, even if they are merely passive 
bystanders, illustrates the great weight courts attach to the duty of employees to assist their 
employer in the prevention of misconduct or criminal activity by anyone at the workplace, 
whether or not they are employees. 
Common purpose can also be used in the context of strike violence, as illustrated in the 
arbitration case of Numsa and others v Dunlop.256 In this case, a number of employees were 
assaulted and their vehicles were stoned. Using photographic evidence of the crowd that was 
present at the scene and from which the main perpetrators came, the company contended that 
the others in the crowd were guilty of misconduct on the basis of common purpose.   
4.6 Strike action and dismissals 
As mentioned in chapter 2, under the common law, a strike is a fundamental breach of the 
employment contract, entitling the employer to dismiss the employee with immediate 
effect.257 However, since the enactment of the LRA, an employee cannot be dismissed solely 
by reason of having participated in a protected strike.258 Thus, an employee will only have 
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committed misconduct if their participation in a strike does not comply with the provisions of 
Chapter IV of the LRA,259 in other words, an employee commits misconduct only when s/he 
embarks on an unprotected strike.260 However, an employee’s participation in an unprotected 
strike does not always warrant their dismissal, which should be considered as a last resort.261 
If an employer decides to dismiss an employee for reasons of having participated in an 
unprotected strike, the dismissal must be determined in light of the circumstances of the 
particular case.262 This includes: (a) the seriousness of the contravention of the LRA, (b) any 
attempts made by an employee to comply with the provisions of the LRA, and whether or not 
the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer.263 
Further, before dismissing an employee, an employer should as soon as possible contact a 
trade union official to discuss the course of action the employer intends to take.264 The 
employer should send an ultimatum in clear and unambiguous terms, and such ultimatum 
should state what the employer requires of the employees and the kind of sanction that the 
employer will impose if the employees fail to comply with the ultimatum.265 The employer 
must give the employees sufficient time to reflect on the ultimatum and respond to it, either 
by complying with it or rejecting it.266 If the employer cannot be reasonably expected to take 
these steps above before dismissing the employees, then the employer may dismiss the 
employees.267 In Modise and others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath,268 the Labour Appeal Court 
endorsed the pre-dismissal approaches to the dismissal of strikers, stating that before an 
employer dismissed employees who embarked on an unprotected strike, the employer should 
firstly hold a hearing and secondly issue a fair and reasonable ultimatum.269 In NUM and 
others v Billard Contractors CC and another,270 the employer dismissed the striking 
employees after they had embarked on unprotected strikes on several different occasions, as a 
response to the suspension of a union shop steward. The Labour Court found that the meeting 
held by the employer with the strikers’ representatives constituted a fair hearing as envisaged 
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in Modise and others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath.271 The Court found further that the notice of 
dismissal issued by the employer after the third strike did not constitute an ultimatum. 
However, the employer was in a position to dismiss the employees only after engaging 
further with the union, and was satisfied that the employees would still not comply with the 
notice. The failure to do so resulted in the dismissal of the employees being procedurally 
unfair.272 
These cases show that there are two conditions that have to be satisfied by an employer when 
dismissing an employee. Firstly, the dismissal must be substantively fair, in other words, the 
employer must have a good reason for dismissing an employer. In the context of strikes, it 
would be that employees embarked on an unprotected strike or a series of unprotected strikes 
and further failed to comply with the employer’s ultimatum. Secondly, although the employer 
is justified in dismissing an employer for strike related reasons, the dismissal must still be 
procedurally fair. If it is not, the dismissed employees will have recourse against the 
employer, on the grounds of a (procedurally) unfair dismissal.   
4.7 Conclusion  
In summary, misconduct can be divided into two categories: in terms of the LRA an 
employee commits misconduct by embarking on a strike that does not comply with the 
provisions of Chapter IV of the LRA. It is also more commonly understood as committing an 
act that contravenes a workplace rule, or the law. This misconduct is not permitted during 
strikes. The most common kinds that occur during strikes are malicious damage to property, 
assault and intimidation. Employees can also be found guilty of committing derivative 
misconduct or common purpose. The author has argued that derivative misconduct could be 
seen as placing a heavy burden on employees to turn against each other and cause further 
tension amongst the workforce, but that it is probably in the best interests of justice. Since the 
enactment of the LRA, an employee cannot be dismissed solely by reason of having 
participated in a strike, especially if the strike was a protected strike. This is because 
dismissal should be considered as the last resort. Before dismissing an employee, the 
employer has to take certain factors into account which include: the seriousness of the 
contravention of the LRA; any attempts made by an employee to comply with the provisions 
of the LRA; and whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the 
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employer. Further, there are various procedural steps the employer must take, such as holding 
hearings, consulting with the relevant union(s) and issuing an ultimatum. Lastly, if the 
circumstances of the strike (due to its intensity) do not permit the employer to take some of 
the above mentioned actions, the employer can dismiss the employees. Chapter 5, which 
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Chapter 5: The liability of trade unions  
5.1 Introduction  
Trade unions play a vital role in ensuring that member concerns, interests and voices are 
heard at the bargaining or negotiation table.273 They also play a vital role in a member’s 
ability to access justice through the courts.274 Owing to the fact that they are the official 
representatives of employees, trade unions can be held liable for any delictual wrongs that 
employees commit during strikes.275 Thus, it is usually in the interests of employers to 
institute action against unions for any delicts committed by employees during strikes. This is 
firstly because it is generally difficult to identify the individual perpetrators of wrongful 
acts.276 Secondly, unions have more money than their individual members and are thus in a 
better position to satisfy any claims for damages instituted against them.277 Further, because 
trade unions can be held liable for the conduct of their members, the union will take active 
steps to ensure that during a strike they are in control of their members and their actions are 
within the bounds of the law.278 This chapter discusses the liability of trade unions towards 
employers, for members’ wrongful actions during strikes, and also their liability towards their 
own members. The liability arises as a consequence of trade unions’ rights and duties under 
the LRA. 
5.2 The rights of trade unions and employers’ organisations 
It is imperative to set out the rights of trade unions, as any liability they may have arises from 
the right they enjoy. Thus, trade unions have the following rights:279 (a) the right to organise; 
(b) the right to self-regulation; (c) the right to be recognised; (d) the right of access to the 
employer’s premises; (e) the right to be consulted; (f) the right to be consulted prior to the 
disciplining of a shop steward; (g) the right to apply for the establishment of a workplace 
forum; (h) the right to elect trade union representatives; (i) the right to represent; (j) the right 
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to information; (k) the right to enter into agreements on behalf of members; and (l) the right 
to apply for admission to bargaining councils. 
5.3 The duties of trade unions 
Since trade unions have rights, they also have duties, which are relevant to their liability. 
Thus, every trade union has the following technical duties:280 (a) to keep books and records of 
its income, expenditure, assets and liabilities, prepare financial statements, and to preserve 
them for at least three years;281 (b) to have its books and records audited;282 (c) to make 
financial statements and the auditor’s report available to members for inspection, and to 
submit them to members’ meetings;283 (d) to keep a list of members, minutes of meetings and 
ballot papers for at least three years;284 (e) to provide the Registrar of the High Court with a 
copy of the auditor’s report, the names and addresses of office-bearers, notice of change of 
address and, by 31 March each year, a statement regarding the number of members;285 and (f) 
to send the Registrar of the High Court a copy of any resolution taken to amend its 
constitution, and the secretary’s certificate that such resolution complies with the 
constitution.286  
In addition to the above technical duties, there are other technical duties that arise due to a 
trade union being a legal body that is governed by the rules in its constitution.287 As a result 
of this, a trade union has a duty to comply with its constitution in respect of its members and 
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5.4 A union’s liability under the Regulation of Gatherings Act289 and the 
Constitution 
5.4.1 The section creating the liability  
In terms of section 11 (1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act,290 if any riot damage occurs as 
a result of a gathering or a demonstration, then the union or employer’s organisation 
responsible for holding that gathering or demonstration, together with its members, will be 
jointly and severally liable for that riot damage.  
5.4.2 The impact of section 11 (1) on a union’s right to freedom of assembly 
under the Constitution 
This has the potential of discouraging unions to exercise their right to freedom of assembly in 
terms of section 17 of the Constitution. In other words, unions could be more reluctant to 
demonstrate, fearing that if they do so, they could be held liable for damage that their 
members cause during the demonstrations.291 This is because although unions have some 
control over their members and their actions, they do not have total control. Members can 
decide to deviate from the agreed plan with the union, thus causing great legal problems for 
the union.292 
5.4.3 Exemption from liability under the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
A person or union/employer’s organisation will escape liability if they are able to prove the 
following:293 (a) that he or it did not permit or plan the act or omission which caused the 
damage; (b) that the act or omission did not fall within the scope of the objectives of the 
gathering or demonstration and was not reasonably foreseeable; and (c) that he or it took all 
reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent the act or omission. Proof that a 
union/employer’s organisation condemned the conduct by its members will not by itself be 
regarded as sufficient proof that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the act. 
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The leading case for union liability under the Regulation of Gatherings Act294 is SATAWU v 
Garvas.295 In this case, SATAWU organised a gathering of thousands of people to register 
certain employment-related concerns of its members within the security industry. The 
gathering was the result of a lengthy strike action in the course of which approximately fifty 
people died. Private property and property of the City of Cape Town was damaged during the 
strike action.  
The Constitutional Court (CC), per Mogoeng CJ, had to decide on the constitutionality of 
section 11 (2) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.296 The first question the Court had to 
answer was whether section 11 (2) creates a real defence that is rationality.297 The second 
question the Court had to answer was whether the defence nevertheless limits the rights 
contained in section 17 of the Constitution and, if so, whether that limitation is justifiable.298  
In relation to the first question, the Court stated that in the context of the purpose of section 
11 (2), the word “and” between subsections (b) and (c) of section 11 (2) must be given its 
ordinary meaning and must be read together in order to support the purpose of the provision 
and its rational outcome. As shown by the purpose of the section, there is no irrational 
outcome.299 The purpose of section 11 (2) as enacted by parliament was to: (i) provide for the 
statutory liability of organisations, in order to avoid the common law difficulties associated 
with proving the existence of a legal duty on the organisation to avoid harm; (ii) afford the 
organiser a tighter defence, allowing it to rely on the absence of reasonable foreseeability and 
the taking of reasonable steps as a defence to the imposition of liability; and (iii) place the 
onus on the defendant to prove this defence, instead of requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate 
the defendant’s wrongdoing and fault.300  
The Court stated further that organisations must be aware of the possibility of damage to 
property and they must take reasonable steps within their power to prevent any harm that is 
                                                          
294 205 of 1993. 
295 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC). 
296 This section provides a limited defence for an organiser of a gathering who is allegedly liable for riot damage 
resulting from that gathering. This liability is created by section 11 (1) of the Act. 
297 Garvas (note 202 above) 4. 
298 ibid . 
299 Garvas (note 202 above) 40, 41. 
300 Garvas (note 202 above) 39. 
Page | 54  
 
reasonably foreseeable, from the beginning of the protest action until its end.301 The Court 
concluded that section 11(2) is rational.302 
In relation to the second question, the Court noted that section 17 of the Constitution is 
worded generously in that it promises people the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and 
present petitions.303 The only condition created by the provision is that such acts must be 
done peacefully and unarmed.304 The Court stated that the limitation to this right was not 
necessarily in its regulation, that is, the fact that it must be peaceful and unarmed in order to 
be constitutionally protected. However, the limitation of the right lies firstly in the cost of 
organising a peaceful protest action, which is felt more by smaller organisations with fewer 
resources. Secondly, an organisation’s liability for any riot damage that occurs is another 
limitation. These two limitations have the effect of deterring organisations from exercising 
this right.305 The Court noted that the purpose of the condition of peaceful protest in the 
provision was to ensure the safety of members of the public, and the purpose of holding the 
organisation liable for members’ riot damage was to ensure that peoples’ rights to physical 
integrity are respected and protected.306 
The Court found that on a proper interpretation of section 11 (2), the section is rational.307 
The Court found further that section 11 (2) did limit the right to assemble, but that such 
limitation on the right to assemble was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.308 SATAWU was held liable for 
damages in the amount claimed, namely R1, 5 million.  
Jafta J provided a well-reasoned dissent to the majority judgment, where he analysed section 
11 (2) and stated that the section does not, either expressly or impliedly, prevent anybody 
from exercising the right in section 17 of the Constitution. Its subject-matter is the defence to 
liability imposed by section 11 (1) which falls outside the scope of the present challenge. It 
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may be that the defence afforded by section 11 (2) is unattainable, but such deficiency does 
not translate into a limitation of section 17 of the Constitution.309  
Jafta J stated further that the application of section 11 (2) is activated by a claim that a 
convener of a gathering be held liable in terms of section 11 (1).  The defence which section 
11 (2) affords may be invoked once there is a claim based on section 11 (1) only.310  
He further found that since the limitation of the right to assemble freely is not contained in 
section 11 (2) but in section 11 (1), which falls outside the boundaries of the present 
challenge, the challenge for constitutional invalidity is ill-conceived.311 As a result of this, 
SATAWU failed to show that section 11 (2) limits the rights in section 17 of the Constitution, 
it was unnecessary to the second leg of the enquiry namely whether the limitation was 
reasonable and justifiable.312  
The author of this dissertation is of the views that section 11 (2) does not limit the right in 
section 17 of the Constitution. The problem for trade unions arises when their members 
commit delictual and criminal acts, whilst exercising such a right. 
5.5 The circumstances in which a member can claim damages from a union 
In FAWU v Ngcobo NO,313 two employees were retrenched and sought their union’s 
assistance by instituting an unfair dismissal claim against the employer. The union initially 
assisted the employees but later failed to pursue their case until it prescribed. The union 
claimed that their dismissals were fair and that it would not further assist the employees in 
challenging their dismissals. As a result of this, the employees instituted action against the 
union. The Constitutional Court held that the union could not rely on the fact that the 
employees could have applied for condonation themselves. The union had breached its duty 
by not referring the dispute before the deadline. The union had been negligent in allowing the 
claim to prescribe, and it cannot be said that the employees had tacitly accepted that the union 
could refer the dispute at any stage, regardless of the statutory deadline. The court held that 
the union was liable to compensate the retrenched employees.314  
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In SAMWU v Jada and others,315 the Spring Town Council’s employees, who were also 
union members, embarked on an illegal strike over the dismissal of four shop stewards. The 
Council issued several warnings but the employees continued striking. As a result of this, the 
employer dismissed the striking employees. The dismissed employees instituted a delictual 
action against the union arguing that they would not have embarked upon the strike and 
continued with the strike if an official employed by the union, had not started the strike and 
its continuation. They argued that the union owed them a duty of care to ensure that they did 
not do anything which would result in their being dismissed, and that duty had been 
breached.  
The Court was satisfied that the decision to go on strike was taken by the employees, even 
though the union official may have suggested it to them. It stated that the employees knew 
that the strike they were about to embark upon would be illegal, and that the union official 
had informed the employees that the union could not participate in their action. The union 
further informed the employees that they had to elect members to represent them, which 
recommendation the employees had approved. The Court found that the employees failed to 
prove that the union owed them a duty of care and that if there was one, the union did not 
breach its duty of care. The Court held that the union was not the cause of the loss which the 
employees allegedly suffered, and that even if the employees did suffer loss and the loss was 
caused by the union, the ratio in Parity Insurance Co Ltd v Marescia and others316 
exonerated the union from liability.317  
This case is an example where union members did not succeed in claiming damages from a 
union or loss from their union.  
5.6 Strike or lock-out that is not in compliance with the LRA 
Section 68 of the LRA empowers the Labour Court with exclusive jurisdiction to interdict 
any person from participating in a strike or lock-out that does not comply with section 64 
(unprotected strike). Section 68 further empowers the Labour Court to order the payment of 
just and equitable compensation for any loss suffered as a result of an unprotected strike or 
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any conduct committed in contemplation or in furtherance of an unprotected strike or lock-
out. Section 68 is restricted to the unprotected strikes only. 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union,318 the union’s members 
embarked on unprotected strikes on two separate occasions, for which the employer obtained 
interdicts. The company suffered loss of approximately R15 million. As to whether 
compensation should be awarded, the Labour Court noted that the words “just and equitable” 
in the LRA meant no more than that compensation awarded must be fair. The Court further 
stated that the section providing for compensation for unprotected industrial action was 
designed to compensate an aggrieved party for losses actually suffered. However, the amount 
of compensation does not need to necessarily reflect the exact amount of loss suffered. 
Regarding the requirements of the Act, the Court noted that, although the strike was of 
relatively short duration, no attempt whatsoever had been made by the union to comply with 
the provisions of Chapter IV of the LRA. The strike was premeditated. The Court ordered the 
union to pay the company the sum of R100 000.00 in monthly instalments of R5 000.00.319 
In Mangaung Local Municipality v SAMWU,320 the employees in the applicant municipality's 
electrical department went on an unprotected strike, as a result of which the employer 
suffered financial loss, due to the employees’ absence from work. The Labour Court held the 
union liable for the loss.  
In Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union 
(FOSAWU),321 the employees embarked on a protected strike in support of a wage dispute 
between the company and the union. Various violent and unlawful acts accompanied the 
strike, including assault, theft, and malicious damage to property and blocking access to and 
egress from the company’s premises. The Labour Court ordered the union to pay the costs of 
the company’s urgent application to interdict the strike.322  
In Mondi Ltd (Mondi Kraft Division) v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied 
Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) and others,323 the company’s employees which were also 
union members embarked on a protected strike, but switched off the company’s machinery at 
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its mill. As a result of this, the company allegedly suffered R673 855.00 in damages for the 
unlawful act. After reviewing the evidence, the Court could not identify the people 
responsible for shutting down the machinery. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever 
that any organ of the union supported the conduct in question let alone authorised it. The 
company had not proved that the union authorised, instigated or ratified the commission of 
the delict. In addition, there was no evidence that the shop stewards council or the agents of 
the union at the mill were involved in the conduct. There was not even evidence proving the 
commission of a crime (that is, the shutdown of the mill). The Labour Court accordingly 
found that the company had failed to discharge the onus upon it to prove that the union was 
liable to compensate it for any damages it may have suffered as a result of the shutdown of 
the mill during the strike.324  
This case shows that in order for unions to be held liable to employers for any loss, 
employers have to prove a link between the loss and the union or a member of the union. A 
court will not readily hold a union liable for damage or loss, without sufficient proof. 
5.7 Conclusion  
In summary, the chapter has shown that trade unions have certain rights and duties in terms 
of the LRA. A trade union can be held liable for riot damage by its members under the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act.325 It has to take certain, active steps to guard against any 
possibility of damage if it is to escape liability under the Act. Members can also hold unions 
liable for loss suffered as a result of a union’s failure to give proper advice to members. 
However, in order for a court to hold a union liable to an employer or its members, either 
party must be able to prove that they suffered loss as a result of the union’s actions or lack 
thereof. Chapter 6, which follows, deals with the social, economic and political factors 
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Chapter 6: The socio-economic and socio-political factors driving 
strike violence 
6.1 Introduction  
Many people believe that violence takes one form: physical or direct violence. However, this 
is not the case, although it can be argued that the most common form of violence is physical 
violence. Another form of violence that exists in society is structural violence, which is 
sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‘structural inequality’.326 This is because 
inequality resulting from structures and systems that have been put in place makes the act of 
perpetuating such inequality, acts of violence. Thus, structural violence can be seen as more 
passive and subtle than physical violence (which is overt and thus easily identifiable).327  
Sometimes the manifestation of physical violence (for example, the damage to an employer’s 
property by striking employees, and the assault and intimidation of non-striking employees 
by striking employees) is a direct result of the structural violence experienced by employees 
at the workplace.328 This is certainly the case regarding most of the strikes that occur in 
labour intensive industries, such as the mining sector, where employees strike for higher 
wages and better working conditions.329 This chapter provides a description and definition of 
structural violence. It further provides an analysis of the 1992 and 2007 South African public 
service strikes. Lastly, it analyses the Marikana strike and some of the root causes of it, as 
identified by various scholars.  
6.2 The description or definition of structural violence  
Ngukaitobi describes structural violence as “a form of violence where some social structure 
or social institution purportedly harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic 
needs.”330 In the context of health, Gilligan defines structural violence as: “the increased rates 
of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as 
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contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them.”331 
This definition suggests that structural violence is some sort of ‘classism’ that occurs in a 
capitalistic society. It depicts working class employees as being socially and economically 
oppressed by the constant desire of middle class employers to make profit and accumulate 
more money than they already have. This is done while disregarding and violating some of 
the basic and fundamental human rights of working class employees.  
6.3 The 1992 and 2007 public service strikes in South Africa 
The 1992 strike was one in the public health sector, which mainly involved the maintenance 
or support staff who worked at various public hospitals in the country. The strike began at the 
Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Johannesburg, Gauteng and spread to thirty two other 
hospitals in the former province of the Transvaal. From there it spread to other public service 
workplaces across the country.332 On the other hand, the 2007 strike was one concerning the 
public health and public education sectors. It also began at the Chris Hani Baragwanath 
Hospital and spread to other hospitals in the Gauteng province. Both strikes were for higher 
wages and were characterised by high levels of violence, including damage to state property 
and the assault and intimidation of non-strikers.333 However, the 1992 strike was viewed by 
many workers and trade unionists as the more notable and successful strike, because its result 
was the formal recognition of the National Education Health & Allied Workers Union 
(NEHAWU) after its launch in 1989.334 
Following interviews with employees, who participated in the 1992 and 2007 strikes, in 
which von Holdt sought answers about the rationale behind strike violence, von Holdt drew 
two inferences. The first is that the conduct of employers prior to the strikes undermined what 
the employees viewed as their collective bargaining rights.335 This essentially “redu[ced] the 
strikes to a naked power struggle [between the employees and the employers].”336 The second 
reason is that employees are generally dissatisfied with their social position in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Von Holdt notes that this is particularly the case with mine workers, who feel 
that they, of all the previously disadvantaged persons who have benefitted by the measures 
                                                          
331 Ngcukaitobi (note 13 above) 841. 
332 von Holdt (note 15 above) 133-4. 
333 von Holdt (note 15 above) 135. 
334 von Holdt (note 15 above) 133. 
335 von Holdt (note 15 above) 128. 
336 Ibid.  
Page | 61  
 
put in place (such as black economic empowerment and affirmative action) to advance 
previously disadvantaged persons, have benefitted the least, if at all.337 Thus, the 
institutionalisation of industrial relations is not attributable solely to labour relations, but 
social and political factors as well.338 
In an interview during the 1992 strike, an employee was asked where the idea of 
incorporating violence into strikes came from, and she replied: “I was a member of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF)…I was part of the school of thought where we had strategies 
for fighting government. We had all the ideas of how to use force if necessary; we were 
taught those things: that we could never submit.”339 This shows that employees have always 
considered the use of force as a viable option during strikes, to the extent of educating each 
other and developing strategies as to the exact ways they would use force against the 
government.  
In an interview during the 2007 strike, one of the persons who participated in the strike stated 
that: “since I was born, I have seen [that] all strikes are violent. There are no…peaceful 
strikes…”340 He added that “if you don’t use force, problems won’t be resolved speedily. 
[Force] puts pressure on the [company] management or government to act.”341 Another 2007 
striker expressed similar views, stating that “violence sends a message to the whole country, 
those responsible will quickly realise they must resolve things. So the violence assists to 
wake up the entire country that the innocent will suffer.”342 The first quote shows that 
violence has become intrinsic343 in South African strikes and that it has become somewhat 
psychological for employees to be violent during strikes. The second and third quotes 
illustrate employees’ awareness of the likelihood of their employers acceding to their 
demands if a strike is violent. Workers’ demands are more likely to be met when violence is 
used. The third quote further shows that strikers have identified the potential and/or actual 
harming of innocent persons as a more effective and speedier solution for getting the 
employer to accede to their demands. This is especially so where the employer is the State 
(which has an interest in the well-being of innocent citizens). 
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The fact that violence was a vital tool in the resistance movement’s struggle against the 
apartheid government appears to have had an influence on the prevalence of violent strikes   
in post-apartheid South Africa. The regime that is in power at the time is irrelevant. A 2007 
striker confirmed this by stating that: “you do not say [in] 1992 it was under apartheid, [in] 
2007 [it] is under [the] ANC. You won’t win a strike like that.”344 This shows that for the 
purpose of winning a strike (by getting the employer to accede the employees’ demands) and 
to the extent that employees’ wages are low and/or working conditions poor, employees view 
the apartheid government and the post-apartheid government as the same. This is why the test 
for deciding whether or not to embark on a strike (as confirmed by the 2007 striker quoted 
directly above) is: ‘whether employees are dissatisfied with their wages and/or working 
conditions’, rather than ‘who is in power’.  
Some employees believe that where the majority of the members in a union vote for use of 
force during a strike (which is prohibited by law), then the law should be disregarded and the 
members must follow the majority decision. Von Holdt terms this as: ‘the law of the majority 
in the union’.345 It is in such instances that some employees believe that contravening the law 
is justified. In an attempt to justify strikers’ disregard for the law when it clashes with the 
majority view of a union, a 2007 striker remarked: “how are we going to be successful in 
winning our demands? We can’t always be upright, umthetho oyaphulwa, oyenzelwe oko 
phulwa.”346 This shows that employees acknowledge that the law will not always favour them 
and they have reconciled themselves to contravening it.   
Perhaps another reason for violence during strikes is to send a clear message to employers 
that although employees are illiterate, they are a force to be reckoned with. Some employees 
believe that their employers mistreat and exploit them because they are illiterate and that their 
employers view their employees as inferior to them.347 This was confirmed by a 2007 striker 
who remarked: “when you fight with an illiterate [person], you must be ready to fight. I might 
start thinking you take advantage [of me], or you do not respect me because I am not 
educated.” He added that: “we use all our force, we pull all the masses. You will never defeat 
us.”348  
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6.4 The Marikana strike 
The Marikana massacre of 2012 is viewed by many people as the most horrific incident of 
police brutality, and the State’s disregard for its citizens’ right to life since the Bhisho 
massacre of 1992. Furthermore, it has been compared with the Sharpeville massacre of 1961, 
and the Soweto massacre/uprising of 1976.349 This is despite the fact that the Sharpeville and 
Soweto massacres started as political events, whereas the Marikana massacre started as a 
labour dispute between Lonmin Plc (Lonmin) and its miners for higher wages.350 The end 
result of the Marikana strike was that 34 Lonmin miners were shot dead by the police and 78 
others were injured.351 
Hartford notes the reality nowadays is that the majority of mine workers have two families to 
support. Thus, there is a greater sense of urgency for miners to earn more money than they 
do, considering that they have two families to feed, as opposed to one.352  This fact, coupled 
with the enormous difference in the earnings of mine workers compared to those of the mine 
management and union officials is another factor that drives employees to strike violently.353 
Hartford notes further that mine workers are heavily exploited. They work between nine and 
15 hours a day,354 12 months a year and they only have a break from work on Christmas day 
and Easter. He states that these were the exact same poor working conditions that miners 
experienced during apartheid and that they have not changed.355 Hartford notes that the rock 
drill operators are the worst off of all the employees who work in the mines. Their job (which 
is to extract platinum from the rocks by drilling through the rocks) is the toughest, most 
dangerous and lowest paid. The reason it is the lowest paid, despite being the toughest and 
most dangerous, is that rock drillers are illiterate and thus have no prospect of getting 
promoted to jobs that require literacy. This is notwithstanding their long service of between 
25 and 35 years.356  
Hartford notes that rock drill operators are a typical example of a miner during the apartheid 
era and that they have benefitted the least from post-apartheid South Africa. Hartford argues 
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that the dire conditions that rock drill operators are subjected to are a “recipe for social 
alienation.”357 It can be argued that such social alienation was a key factor leading to the 
Marikana strike, considering that the strike was planned by an informal strike committee358 
established by rock drill operators in order to voice their concerns over low wages and poor 
working conditions. The strike was neither planned nor endorsed by NUM, which was the 
majority union at the Marikana mine at the time of the strike.359   
It could be argued that miners are justified in striking for higher wages, even if the amounts 
for which they strike are viewed by their employers as absurd.360 This is because mine bosses 
also increase their performance salaries/bonuses drastically and disproportionately to the way 
they have actually performed.361 For example, Ngcukaitobi notes that in a recent working 
paper, the International Labour Office, referred to an increasing gap between salaries of chief 
executive officers and average or low-skilled employees in South African industries.362 The 
paper revealed that “executive directors’ fees in the private sector increased by thirty eight 
per cent between 2003 and 2004, while company performance measured on pre-tax profit 
only increased by twenty three per cent, showing a discrepancy between executive pay and 
executive performance.”363 Thus, it is hypocritical for mine bosses to state that miners make 
unreasonable demands when they merely seek wage increases to improve their poor standard 
of living, while mine bosses increase their salaries for far more trivial reasons than those of 
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6.5 Conclusion  
The author has provided a description of structural violence, namely that workers are denied, 
through the entrenchment of a social structure or system, the opportunity to enjoy their basic 
human rights. Workers feel aggrieved that they have benefitted the least from post-apartheid 
South Africa. Violence has become intrinsic in South African strikes and has turned into a 
psychological issue for employees. Employees are aware that employers are most likely to 
accede to their demands if they incorporate violence into strikes. Further, strikers have 
identified the potential and/or actual harming of innocent persons as an effective and speedier 
solution of getting the employer to accede to their demands. The regime that is in power at 
the time is irrelevant. Workers will embark on strike action if they are dissatisfied with their 
wages and their working and/or living conditions. Workers know that the law does not 
always favour them and they have accepted that they will sometimes contravene the law. 
Miners, particularly rock drill operators, are paid extremely low wages. This is despite the 
fact that they do the toughest and riskiest work. They have long service records at the mining 
companies and the majority of them have two families to feed. The Marikana strike, amongst 
others that have occurred in the mining sector since then (such as the record five month long 
platinum strike that occurred early this year) is a clear indication that the arguably sub-human 
treatment of mine workers has taken its toll on them and that they are willing to fight this, 
despite the cost. Chapter 7, which follows, consists of recommendations or possible solutions 
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Chapter 7: Recommendations and conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter begins with a discussion of whether there is any realistic and practical alternative 
to majoritarianism. It then discusses the comparative extent to which the LRA, and socio-
economic and socio-political factors, contribute to strike violence in South Africa. This is 
done by briefly analysing sections 64 and 65 of the LRA, and then analysing the socio- 
economic and socio-political factors that drive strike violence.  
The chapter follows with a summary of all the chapters (one to six) and ends with a 
concluding remark. 
7.2 Any alternative to majoritarianism? 
It is easy to say that the principle of majoritarianism should be discarded, as it is highly 
controversial and has an adverse consequence for minority unions.364 One alternative to 
majoritarianism could be employers concluding collective agreements with all trade unions 
that have members in the employer’s workforce, regardless of the percentage of the 
workforce in a union. This would mean, for example, that if twenty different unions had 
members in an employer’s workforce, that employer would have to conclude twenty different 
collective agreements with each union. Such a situation would be detrimental to the 
maintenance of uniformity in the workplace, and would make agreements on simple and 
generally accepted workplace rules and standards difficult. With every trade union having its 
own view on every issue affecting its members, unreasonable demands could be made on any 
issue, ranging the starting and ending times of work, to serious issues such as wages, changes 
to terms and conditions of employment, or the restructuring of a shift system.  
Majoritarianism avoids that kind of chaos and lack of order and uniformity by ensuring that 
there are set rules for generally accepted workplace norms, such as work hours, thereby 
eliminating the need to debate such issues; instead every employee is bound by them.365 Only 
those trade unions which meet the threshold of sufficient representivity have a say (in the 
form of initiating and organising a strike) regarding more serious issues in dispute between an 
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employer and a minority union, and that are not regulated by a collective agreement.366 Thus, 
it can be argued that although majoritarianism is controversial, it is good for workplace 
certainty and stability. Without it, there would be no other practical alternative able to 
maintain uniformity and compliance with generally accepted workplace rules and norms.  
The author of this dissertation recommends that majoritarianism remains in place until a 
better alternative is found. However, to lessen controversy surrounding majoritarianism, 
majority trade unions should not be able to unreasonably increase the threshold for sufficient 
representivity. Further, a collective agreement concluded between an employer and a 
majority trade union should generally not be unreasonably extended to non-parties. 
7.3 Analysis of section 64 of the LRA 
The two purposes of the pre-strike procedures contained in section 64 of the LRA are clear. 
The first purpose is to provide the parties with an opportunity for conciliation and possible 
settlement of the dispute.367 This is imperative before embarking on a strike, in an attempt to 
avoid it happening, and the many adverse consequences for all parties involved. The second 
purpose is to allow the employer time to prepare for any possible strike action.368 The 
importance of this is to prevent chaos in the workplace by giving the employer an opportunity 
to implement contingency measures to reduce the damaging effects of a strike on the 
business.369 This is consistent with one of the objectives of the legislator and the courts 
(through the interpretation of the LRA), to advance and protect both the rights of the 
employers and the employees, and to balance the interests of both, rather than favour one 
over the other. Thus, it can be argued that there is nothing wrong with the pre-strike 
procedures, as they are designed to maintain industrial peace and order, while allowing 
workers to exercise their right to strike. Thus, the pre-strike procedures do not appear to be a 
major cause of strike violence. However, workers may be frustrated at the idea of having to 
first follow certain lengthy protocols before they embark on a strike, as this effectively limits 
their right to strike, which could contribute to strike violence, but to a minimal extent. 
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7.4 Analysis of section 65 of the LRA 
The prohibition of employees from striking over certain issues in dispute, as per section 65 of 
the LRA, does not seem to contribute to strike violence. This is because it is not a central 
issue that workers generally have a problem with, to the extent that they would get violent 
during a strike. Many labour law cases show that workers usually strike over issues with 
greater substance that impact heavily on their daily lives, such as wage increases, or the 
dismissal or retrenchment of workers or shop stewards. Thus, it seems unlikely that this 
prohibition could be a factor that contributes to strike violence. If it does, the contribution is 
minimal. 
The fact that section 65 of the LRA prohibits strike action by essential service or maintenance 
service employees is justified,370 as some of the country’s most important sectors (such as the 
health sector and defence force) would come to a standstill if these workers were to strike. 
Therefore, when persons apply for employment in essential services or maintenance services 
they ought to know that they are prohibited from striking. However, the law is bound to have 
flaws. This is because no law can be said to be perfect, especially in a country with an 
elaborate and sensitive history like South Africa, where the people have different 
backgrounds and cultures, and many competing interests which the legislator and the courts 
must consider and balance when making and interpreting laws. Thus, the author submits that 
strike violence in South Africa can be attributable, to a limited extent, to some of the 
country’s (fallible) laws. 
7.5 Analysis of the socio-economic and socio-political factors that drive 
strike violence 
Workers are passionate and sensitive about socio-economic and socio-political issues that 
affect their daily lives. It is no surprise, therefore, that a person’s financial status directly 
affects, among other things, the kind and quality of food they eat; the kind of house they live 
in; the kind of schools they send their children to; the class of people they socialise with; and 
the level of respect they are generally given by people, or the way they are treated by society. 
Thus, a worker’s financial status directly impacts on his human dignity,371 and if a worker 
feels that their employer is compromising their dignity, they are highly likely to retaliate 
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without any limits or sense of self-restraint. The classic case of a scorned worker is a mine 
worker, particularly a rock drill operator (the least earning miner). As has been stated and 
discussed repeatedly in this study, rock drill operators experience the greatest kind structural 
violence in the form of extremely low wages and poor working and living conditions.372 In 
addition to this, mine workers feel that they can no longer rely on their union representatives 
to speak to mine management about their grievances, as union officials can develop close and 
sometimes inappropriate relationships with mine management.373 A loss of confidence in 
their own leaders is what led rock drill operators at the Marikana mine to form their own 
committee to represent their interests.374 In light of all the above, the author of this 
dissertation submits that socio-economic and socio-political factors play a greater role in 
strike violence than does the law. Thus, in order to curb strike violence, employers need to 
revisit workers’ pay grades and consider the reasonable increase of their wages. Employers, 
such as mining companies, who make huge profits, should consider the profits with the 
workers. Further, employers need to improve their worker’s working and living conditions, 
and restructure the operations of the workplace in a way that better accommodates workers.  
7.6 Summary of the chapters and final remark 
In chapter 1, the study set out the background of strikes in South Africa. The study identified 
the problem it seeks to address, namely the relationship that exists between strikes and the 
collective violence that has increasingly accompanied strikes over the years. The study set out 
its objectives namely: (a) to explore the relationship between the strike action and the 
ensuring violence, and to establish the possible factors of violent strikes; (b) to examine the 
legal mechanisms which have been put in place by the legislature to regulate the violence 
associated with strikes and further to determine the sufficiency of these legal mechanisms; (c) 
to consider whether there is a need for an improvement in the legal mechanisms, and to 
provide some possible solutions that could assist in curbing violent strikes; (d) to explore the 
importance of the right to strike, and discuss the challenges which have come with that right. 
The study has met these objectives, and the more specific objectives which have been broken 
down into five research questions, as seen in chapter 1 of the dissertation. 
                                                          
372 Ngcukaitobi (note13 above) 839. 
373 Capps (note 329 above) 10. 
374 Ngcukaitobi (note13 above) 837. 
Page | 70  
 
In chapter 2, the study set out the legal framework of strikes in South Africa, which includes: 
(a) the statutory definition of a strike. The study has shown that from this definition, a strike 
can take different forms – it can either be primary or secondary. Further, there are three 
important types of primary strikes, namely: a full work stoppage; a repetition/intermittent 
strike; and a partial strike. It has been noted that there are two different kinds of strike action 
contained in the LRA, namely protected and unprotected strikes, and that each strike has 
different consequences. The right to strike is contained in section 23 (2) (c) of the 
Constitution and section 64 of the LRA. The right to strike in the Constitution is granted to 
every worker, whereas in the LRA it is granted to every employee.  Thus, the Constitution 
provides for a wider scope of inclusion of persons in the right to strike, than that in the LRA.  
The study has stated that the Constitution does not expressly limit the right to strike, but that 
despite this, the right to strike is subject to the general limitations clause contained in section 
36 of the Constitution. There are procedural and substantive limitations on the right to strike. 
The procedural limitations are contained in section 64 of the LRA, and they are procedures 
that a trade union and its employees must follow before embarking on a strike, in order for 
the strike to be protected. The substantive limitations are contained in section 65 of the LRA 
and they are divided into two: firstly, section 65 prohibits strike action over certain issues in 
dispute; and secondly, it prohibits certain employees from striking. It has been stated that 
there are three further substantive limitations on the right to strike that have been read into the 
LRA by case law. These are: (a) when the demand requires the employer to act unlawfully; 
(b) when the demand requires the employer to act unreasonably; and (c) demands with which 
an employer cannot deal. Lastly, the author stated that the Constitutional Court in South 
African National Defence Union (SANDU) v Minister of Defence and others375 found that the 
limitations on the right to strike passed constitutional muster and were thus justified.  
In chapter 3, the study set out the different legal mechanisms an employer can use, or the 
legal steps an employer can take to try to prevent, minimise and/or regulate violence during 
strikes. The first mechanism proposed by the author was the formation of proper relationships 
with employees through collective agreements. The study stated that there were two different 
kinds of collective agreements provided for in the LRA, namely agency shop agreements and 
closed shop agreements. The study argued that there has been a lot of controversy 
surrounding closed shop agreements. Many labour law scholars neither agree with the way 
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closed shop agreements operate, nor with the effect of non-compliance on employees. The 
study discussed the principle of majoritarianism and explained the controversy surrounding 
this principle in so far as it creates obstacles for minority unions in a workplace. The second 
mechanism proposed by the author was that the employer and recognised trade unions in a 
workplace try to reach agreement on rules of picketing. The third mechanism proposed by the 
author was that if employees fail to comply with picketing rules or embark on an unprotected 
strike (which occurs more often than not) an employer can obtain a prohibitory interdict from 
the Labour Court, preventing workers from embarking on or continuing to embark on that 
strike. The study has shown that strike interdicts are disobeyed by employers and most 
employees. Therefore, they are often not worth the paper on which they are written. The 
fourth mechanism proposed by the author is for an employer to institute legal action in which 
the employer claims delictual damages when employees damage property during a protected 
or unprotected strike. Lastly, the author proposed that an employer lays a charge of 
misconduct against the employees, in the event that they commit any misconduct while 
embarking on a strike. 
In chapter 4, the study has indicated that there are two different kinds of misconduct: firstly, 
participation in an unprotected strike is misconduct,376 and secondly misconduct occurs when 
strikers commit criminal and/or delictual acts during strikes. It has been stated that the most 
common kinds of misconduct committed during strike action are damage to property, 
intimidation, and assault.377 The study has discussed the concept of derivative misconduct 
and showed, by providing case law, how it applies in practice. It has been argued that the 
principle of derivative misconduct places a heavy burden on employees to turn against their 
co-workers. The doctrine of common purpose (which is similar to derivative misconduct) was 
also briefly discussed and the author showed, by providing case, how it applies in practice.  
The study has discussed dismissal in the context of strikes. It has been made clear that since 
the enactment of the LRA, an employee cannot be dismissed solely by reason of having 
participated in a strike, especially if the strike was a protected one.378 This is because 
dismissal should be considered as the last resort.379 Further, before dismissing an employee, 
an employer has to take certain factors into account, namely: the seriousness of the 
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contravention of the LRA; any attempts made by an employee to comply with the provisions 
of the LRA; and whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the 
employer.380 In addition to this, there are various procedural steps an employer must take 
before dismissing an employee, such as holding hearings, consulting with the relevant 
union(s) and issuing an ultimatum.381 Lastly, the study stated that if the circumstances of the 
strike (due to its intensity) do not permit the employer to take some of the above mentioned 
actions, the employer can dismiss the employees.382 
In chapter 5, the study set out the rights of trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
Thereafter, the author set out the duties of trade unions. A union’s liability under the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act,383 was discussed, including the section creating the liability 
(section 11 (1)); the impact of section 11 (1) on a union’s right to freedom of assembly under 
the Constitution; and the circumstances under which a union is exempt from liability under 
the Regulation of Gatherings Act.384 The study provided an analysis of the leading case for 
union liability under the Regulation of Gatherings Act,385 namely SA Transport and Allied 
Workers Union v Garvas.386 The author showed, through case law, the circumstances in 
which a member can claim damages from a union, namely where a union breaches its duty of 
care towards its members or fails to represent its members when necessary. Lastly, the study 
showed, through case law, how the labour court deals with strikes that are not in compliance 
with the LRA, including interdicting the strike and ordering a union to pay an employer 
compensation for loss suffered as result of a strike.387 
In chapter 6, the study stated that violence can be either physical or structural. The study 
indicated that structural violence can be understood as a form of violence where some social 
structure or social institution allegedly harms people by preventing them from meeting their 
basic needs.388 The study argued that structural violence can thus be seen as more passive and 
subtle than physical violence (which is overt and more easily identifiable). The study 
analysed the responses given by some of the 1992 and 2007 public service strikers during 
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interviews with them by scholars and researchers. Various inferences regarding the reason 
strikes turn violent can be drawn from the responses given by the interviewed strikers. These 
inferences include the following: (a) South Africans have over the years developed a culture 
of violence as a way of dealing with problems;389 (b) strikers have identified the use of force 
against innocent non-strikers as an effective way of getting the employer/management to 
accede to their demands;390 (c) a lot of workers are illiterate and believe that their employers 
ill treat them because they are illiterate.391 Thus, violence is a way of showing their 
employers that although illiteracy may be their weakness, force is their strength.  
The study discussed some of the structural violence that miners’ experience, which many 
scholars and researchers believe led to the Marikana massacre. Miners, particularly rock drill 
operators, are paid extremely low wages.392 This is despite the fact that: (a) the majority of 
them have two families to feed; (b) they work between nine and 15 hours a day, 12 months a 
year; (c) they do the toughest and riskiest work; and (d) they have long service records with 
the mining companies.393 Further, the close relationships that union officials are increasingly 
having with mine management makes workers believe that their grievances are not being 
taken up to the mine management, and that they are not well represented by their trade 
unions.394  
Finally, it can be said that there is no simple and singular approach to curbing violent strikes 
in South Africa. Achieving this requires a complex, multi-pronged approach and a joint effort 
from all parties who are affected by strike violence (namely employers, employees, trade 
unions, and government, in its capacity as stakeholder in the well-being of South Africa, and 
as the representative of South African citizens) to engage in good faith negotiations, debates 
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